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Censorship; the Canadian News
Media and Afghanistan: A Historical
Comparison with Case Studies
Dr. Robert Bergen
ABSTRACT
Official censorship of the news media by the Canadian government has
only occurred twice in the history of the nation: during the First and Second
World Wars. Yet, the news media was quick to use the word "censorship"
when the first ground rules agreement for the news media was developed
by the Canadian Forces during the 199.1 Persian Gulf War to restrict what
journalists aboard its ships could write about. Canada's involvement in the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan provides a rich oppor-
tunity to examine whether the Canadian news media faces either official or
unofficial censorship in its reporting on the war in Kandahar, the Canadians'
area of responsibility. It also provides an opportunity to conduct case study
research and to compare and contrast the Canadian news media's coverage
of selected Canadian combat operations during the First and Second World
Wars, the Korean War, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo air war
and in Afghanistan. This study suggests that journalists and the military
alike have both been involved in censorship at different times and to varying
degrees throughout these conflicts.
I t will come as no surprise to many that the Canadian Forces (CF) often re-stricts what the Canadian news media can learn about its military oper-
ations in Afghanistan. This paper will demonstrate that the Canadian
military is also ready, willing, and able to limit what academics can learn
about its restrictions on the news media and what Canadian society as a whole
can learn about the Afghan mission. The overarching reality that frames this
paper is the truism that freedom of information is hot absolute in military
affairs but is limited by "operational security" and the varying degrees of
commitment on the part of both the Canadian news media and Canadian
forces members to keeping Canadians well-informed about Canada's role in
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
CENSORSHIP
Operational security is "the principle of safeguarding the integrity of a
military operation, and/or the safety of the CF members and other personnel
involved in the military operation or activity.") In Afghanistan, operational
security restrictions placed on journalists that limit what they can report
upon are enshrined in the ground rules agreement all must sign prior to be-
ing "embedded" with the Canadian Forces. Embedding means being able to
travel with the Canadian Forces on missions when possible, being provided
. food and shelter, and given as much access to soldiers as possible given oper-
ational security concerns.
A special team of mjIitary officers, created in March 2007, adds a
second layer of restrictions placed on journalists and others, academics in-
cluded, severely limiting what Canadians can know about Canada's role in
Afghanistan. The so-called "Tiger Team" - the Strategic Joint Staff initiative
originally established to scrutinize Access to Information Act (AT!) requests
related to a number of Military Police Complaint Commission investiga-
tions into !he handling of Afghan detainees - now has a broad mandate to
restrict a wide variety of i~ormation about the Afghan conflict.2 Included
in the information that cannot be released is: "Any AT! request for informa-
tion related to DETAINEES, or Battle Damage Assessments (any report SOp,
SIR, sitrep related to IEDs, Vehicle Damage casualties, protection, armour
enhancements.)"3
Most alarming about this news report is its extensive quoting of a May,
2007, Strategic Joint Staff record documenting the genesisof the team: "This
is the first time that the [Canadian Forces] have been engaged in hostilities
since the Access Act was introduced in 1985. It has been a learning experience
and a number of mistakes have been made. We have noted tendencies to be
both too restrictive and too open in releasing information."4
That statement went unchallenged in the news report. Yet, the first sen-
tence is simply and stunningly inaccurate. The Access Act was in place during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War and was in use during the 1999 Kosovo Air War.
The critical question is: if the author got such historically established facts
wrong, what else is inaccurate within the original document? That question
offers opportunity to review the history of the restrictions placed on the
news media during the 199.1 Persian Gulf war to the layers of restrictions
it faces in Afghanistan and the strategic implications for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), to which
Canada is but one contributor.
It will shock many academics to learn that the Canadian Forces actively
restricted this researcher's attempts to examine the working relationship be-
tween the Canadian news media in Afghanistan and the Canadian Forces
for this paper. It did that through Canadian Forces Senior Public Affairs
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Advisor Lieutenant Commander Al Wong, who instructed this author that
there would be no access to the Canadian news media during a research
trip by eight Canadian Security and Defence Forum scholars to Afghanistan,
which was organized jointly for the first time by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the Canadian Department of National Defence from
December 12 to December 20, 2007. Wong acted as the group's escort in
Brussels, Belgium, and in Afghanistan. The group was technically referred
to as stakeholders: "business, academic aDd community leaders, parliamen-
tarians and others."s Its acronym was COLA, short for Canadian Opinion
Leaders Afghanistan.
In order to be part of the visiting delegation, on the first leg of the trip
at NATO headquarters in Belgium, all members had to sign a stakeholder
ground rules agreement and a Code of Service Discipline Acknowledgement
for a Visit to a Deployed CF Operation, agreeing to comply with all lawful
orders and instructions. These agreements are similar to the dqcuments
journalists must sign prior to being embedded with the Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan. The major difference between the stakeholders' ground rules
and the journalists' ground rules was the absence of the following clause:
"Embedded journalists will remain with military escorts at all times and fol-
low their instructions regarding activity and movement."6
The restriction on access to the news media was challenged by the
author at every turn, including during meetings in Kabul with Canadian
Colonel Brett Boudreau, Public Affairs Advisor to NATO's Chairman of the
Military Committee and to the Director International Military Staff and with
Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Arif Lalani, neither of whom could
understand why access to the news media was being denied. No reason was
given why access was denied but it is possible to speculate why.
One reason might be that the Forces did not welcome academic scrutiny
of its media relations in Afghanistan. Another reason might be that, had the
news media learned of the academics' research trip, it could have turned into
a news story in Canada. Such a news story might have exposed the Canadian
Forces to questions from critics opposed to the mission, which is not to imply
that the academics were advocates for it. Thirdly, news of the academics'
trip may have conveyed the message to some that the military had created a
shadow or alternate panel to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role
in Afghanistan, chaired by the Honourable John Manley. The academics fol-
lowed in the footsteps of the panel which had visited Afghanistan the previous
week. Regardless, those are political reasons, which have nothing to do with
the principle of operational security.
The ground rules are clear: "Ground rules for stakeholders' visit are not
intended to restrict the flow of information to non-military visitors. Their
3
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purpose is to ensure that classified or operationally sensitive information
is not inadvertently released, thereby compromising operational secur-
ity."? One sentence in the ground rules that give on-the-spot discretionary
powers to public affairs officers bears examination. "DECPR (Directorate of
External Communications and Public Relations) and in-theatre public affairs
(PA) staff, in coordination with CEFCOM, may enhance these ground rules [my
emphasis], as the situation or operation requires." Wide latitude, it would ap-
pear, is given to public affairs officers in the exercise of their own judgment.
Regardless, knowing what constitutes an operational security issue and
what does not, this author accidentally met a well-known Canadian journal-
ist - Graeme Smith of the Globe and Mail, the only correspondent covering
Afghanistan full-time - at a dinner hosted by the Canadian Embassy in
Kabul. At the first opportunity after dinner, the military's attempt to restrict
access to him was discussed with Smith in private and e-mail addresses
were exchanged for later correspondence. The Canadian Forces public affairs
officer was visibly upset. But, clearly, an academic speaking to a journalist
did not assault the integrity of the military mission. He did not jeopardize
the safety of the Canadian Forces members and other personnel involved.
Had this not been the case, the author would have been removed from the
research trip under the terms and conditions of the embedding agreement.
The Canadian Forces is a government institution and the literature on State
interference in academic freedom is clear and is worth referencing at length:
It is in this situation that it has become necessary to reassert
the medieval ideal of liberties, to argue that Universities have
their own independent sphere of judgment, in which the State
should not meddle. The argument runs that it is only by this sort
of autonomy to govern their own affairs that academics may pro-
tect a world in which they are free to exercise their basic rights
of freedom of speech and of thought. It is not enough to defend
these by the law of the State alone, when the State may, perhaps
entirely unwittingly, take away conditions in which these rights
can be exercised. The opinion that government is devaluing the
standards of the University degree, for example, enjoys only a nu-
gatory freedom if it can only be asserted by spitting in the wind,
against opponents who enjoy overwhelming physical and finan-
cial power. The standards of the University degree and many
other things also, can only ever be defended effectively if they are
recognized as purely academic matters, in which the State can
have no legitimate say. It is only by defending a medieval liberty,
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a sphere of academic freedom in which the State does not enter,
that academic freedom in a military sense can ever be effectively
defended. If the state cannot accept this, Universities should not
continue to exist, for they will serve no useful purpose save that
of rubber-stamping decisions reached in ignorance by the State.s
This is not a paper detailing a government's assault on academic freedom:
that is a subject fit for another paper. This topic is mentioned to help the reader
understand that the Canadian military's meddling with academic freedom
restricted research which most certainly would have widened the scope of
this paper on the news media and Afghanistan. There was simply no justifi-
able operational security reason for that action. Thus, this paper examines
the news media's coverage of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan on a con-
tinuum that begins with the First World War, and follows with the Second
World War, the Korean War, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 1999 Kosovo
Air War in order to enable contrasts and comparisons. It is noteworthy
that W.H. Kesterton, the pre-eminent authority on the history of Canadian
journalism, wrote that the Canadian government has only invoked military
censorship twice, during the First and Second World Wars.
The First World War
In' Canada, a voluntary press censorship was set up early during the First
World War under the Department of Militia and Defence with a Deputy
Chief Censor. Canada's communications facilities were meshed with a na-
tionwide cable, radio-telegraph, telegraph, and telephone censorship. That
network was tied in with Empire Cable and wireless censorship headed by
the Chief Censor in London, England. A September 12, 1914, directive set out
information useful to the enemy, dealt with prevention of espionage, security
of the Armed Forces, and the welfare of the Canadian people. In June, 1915,
regulations made press censorship mandatory, set out what matter was ac-
ceptable or unacceptable, and authorized censors who had the power to enter
printing and press establishments.9
F1u removed from the European theatres of war, Canadians were largely
informed of the overseas events of the First World War by news reports from
the front, which were highly censored by British military authorities. Most
of the news reports received were not of the more than 15,600 Canadians
dying horribly in less than a month in the mud of Passchendale, but of ridicu-
lously upbeat versions of battle.1O From the news media's perspective, with
the exception of socialist, anti-imperialist, rural and certain French Canadian
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publications, partisanship was the norm among the nation's major daily
newspapers. Typically, the Manitoba Free Press proclaimed upon the news
that 6,000 Canadians had died at the second battle of Ypres: "above the tears
... there rose steady and clear the voice of thankfulness to God ... that they
were permitted in their death to make so splendid a sacrifice."l1
In lieu of Cana<fian war correspondents at the front, expatriate William
Maxwell Aitken, a successful British newspaperman, became Canada's
"Eyewitness" under the authority of the Canadian War Records Office
in London. He purposefully made few trips to the front after viewing the
horrific second battle at Ypres. He described that battle as an "uplifting and
heroic struggle where Canada's superior fighting men sowed the seeds of
a proud nationalism."12 Similarly, he glorified the disaster at St. Eloi's cra-
ters in which nearly 1,400 Canadians were accidentally cut down by Allied
fire as the result of a lack of communication, difficulties in observation from
the rear, and misconceptions of the Canadians' positions. By contrast, 483
Germans were lost. Still, Aitken wrote in his weekly dispatch for the week
of April 11 to 18, 1916: "During the period that our troops held in the line in
front of St. Eloi the circumstances of the fighting afforded a wealth of op-
portunity for deeds of daring, and several members of each battalion greatly
distinguished themselves in the eyes of their comrades."13
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, who wrote the official history of the Canadian
in the First World War, described St. Eloi as a fiasco and claimed that Aitken
knew full well the extent of the disaster. It was Aitken, as the General
Representative of Canada at the Front, who cabled Minister of the Militia
Colonel Sam Hughes warning him that the British viewed the errors at St.
Eloi as serious "and responsibility wide-spreading."14 That Aitken misled
Canadians with his upbeat dispatches about the debacle bothered him not a
whit. He explained: "It may not be pleasant to issue false news, but if those
at horne could be taken into our confidence I feel quite certain they would
endorse the scheme."ls As Humbolt Wolfe wrote, "You cannot hope to bribe
or twist, Thank God! The British journalist; But seeing what the man will
do, unbribed, there's no occasion to."16 There was no real need for censorship
with Aitken writing such drivel. Most would say that was a dark period in
Canadian journalism, but it was little better during the Second World War, as
reporting on the Dieppe Raid illustrates.
The Second World War: The Dieppe Raid
Censorship of the news media was set up during the Second World War
under the Defence of Canada Regulations that derived their authority from
the War Measures Act as set out in Chapter 206 of the 1927 Revised Statutes of
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CanadaP The censors were advisors only and could not prohibit the publica-
tion of articles. Newspapers' guilt or non-guilt for violations could only be
decided upon by the court. The sole power possessed by the Chief Censor
was to say that information was in non-violation, meaning that a newspaper
could not be prosecuted if it had obtained censorship clearance. Possible pen-
alties included fines, imprisonment, and suspension.18
Against this back-drop, the news coverage of the Dieppe Raid offers a
rich case study to illustrate how Canadian journalists who witnessed the car-
nage on August 19, 1942, reported the news. Nearly 5,000 Canadian soldiers
made up the vast majority of 6,000 Allied troops who stormed the heavily de-
fended beach at Dieppe that day in a raid on the German-held French coast.
By historical accounts, the action was a tactical disaster that some suggest
should never have taken place. Of 4,963 Canadians embarking on their first
live action in Europe, only 2,210 returned. Of them, 807 were killed in action,
100 died of wounds, 586 were wounded, and 1,874 were taken prisoner.19
. Canadian Press war correspondent Ross Munro was among four
Canadian journalists who accompanied the Canadian troops as they pow-
ered toward the beaches at Dieppe. Munro had covered Canadian training
in England and Scotland and was present for Operation Gauntlet, a ten-day
Canadian raid in August and September 1941 on the island of Spitzbergen,
east of Greenland. Munro was also present for Canadians' training activities
for the first planned raid on Dieppe through June and July 1942, although
he was unable to report on them for security reasons.20 The leading histories
that address the Dieppe raid's press coverage say that there were two other
Canadian correspondents accompanying the troops on the raidY The two
most often cited are Fred Griffen of the Toronto Star and Wallace Reyburn,
London correspondent for the Montreal Star. 22 In fact, there was a fourth:
radio broadcaster Bob Bowman of the CBC, who used the BBC's facilities to
transmit his broadcasts. Army Co~manderGeneral Andrew McNaughton
welcomed the idea of having CBC correspondents along, but accreditation
rested with the War Office, which retained a First World War aversion for war
correspondents. However, with the help of Canadian High Commissioner
Vincent Massey and his assistant, Lester B. Pearson, the CBC received ac-
creditation to the British Expeditionary Force, which gave them access to the
entire British-Canadian Front.23
All the journalists were in military uniform with war correspondents'
badges, but upon arrival in Bath those badges were replaced with second-
lieutenants' pips. The exception was the Toronto Star's Griffen a late arrival
who was given Canadian army public relations officer Major Cliff Wallace's
battle dress. The journalists were clandestinely briefed about the impend-
ing Dieppe raid by Wallace in a lattice work summerhouse in the middle of
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a park.24 They were told they could report events "honestly and fearlessly
within the limitations permitted by considerations of security."25 Munro, the
most experienced war correspondent among them, was assigned to accom-
pany the Royal Regiment that was to land at Puys, while Reyburn was placed
with to the South Saskatchewan Regiment that was to land at Pourville.
Bowman was assigned to a landing craft carrying the Calgary Tanks. Griffin
was in another tank-landing craft carrying the Army Film and Photo Unit
that was to land at Dieppe's main beach.
Reyburn's landing craft was the first to reach the beaches at 4:50 a.m.
The South Saskatchewans were apparently the only Canadians to take the
enemy by surprise. They made it up to the promenade's parapet undetected
and beg'an cutting barbed wire before coming under enemy fire. Reyburn
made it across the promenade and into a house where a headquarters was
established. After leaving that building, he was wounded in the back by
shrapnel. The Saskatchewans achieved their objectives by 9 a.m. and had to
endure nearly two hours of German fire on the beach before the Royal Navy
evacuated them.26
Bowman's landing craft, meanwhile, never made it to the beach. It was
a sitting duck, bobbing in Dieppe harbour for eight hours as it tried time
and time again to land and disgorge its tanks. It was finally driven back by
dive-bombers and gunfire, pulling back to the destroyer line and returning
to England. While floating offshore, Bowman said he could see German sol-
diers on the cliffs lobbing grenades on the ships below and knew the engin-
eers and Queen's Own Camerons were getting the worst ohhe battle.27
Munro appears to have witnessed the most bloodshed. As a result, and
without disservice intended to the others, this paper focuses on his work.
From his vantage point on the landing craft, Munro said he could see sand-
bagged German positions from the top of the cliff at Puys, in houses and in
the cliff's clefts raining machine gun fire down on the hapless Canadians.
To his horror, he had to look no farther than his own craft to see its bottom
covered with dead troops who had been machine-gunned. The first clue he
had that the attack on the main beach had gone horribly wrong was after the
boat pulled away from Puys; it attempted to radio the main beach for help
with casualties. There was no answer.28
From the Queen Emma, Munroe could see the Puys beachfront littered
with countless Canadian soldiers' bodies, cut down before they could fire a
shot. Courageously, he jumped from retreating vessel to retreating vessel in
the boat pool in an attempt to ascertain what was happening. At one point, a
craft he was in touched down on the main beach, and he made his way across
the shale to the sea wall where Canadians lay dead.29 Later, from an escaping
vessel, he watched a furious air battle overhead as landing craft after Allied
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landing craft were blown out of the water.30 After the war, he wrote in retro-
spect that: "On no other front have I witnessed such carnage. It was brutal
and terrible and shocked you almost to insensibility to see the piles of dead
and feel the hopelessness of the attack at this point."31
Some of the first news of the raid on Dieppe appeared in Toronto's Globe
and Mail, the Calgary Herald, and the Regina Leader Post, August 19,1942, the day
of the raid. The Globe carried a short Canadian Press story on its front page of
a communique issued by Combined Operations Headquarters, which stated
that French citizens had been advised the action was a raid, not an invasion.32
The Herald ran four stories on its front page. Its un-bylined main Canadian
Press story from London reported Allied troops were re-embarking from
French soil after all chief objectives had been achieved. The source for the
story was Combined Operations and Headquarters, which was in the midst
of a public relations disaster. While casualties were said to have been heavy,
re-embarkation was being conducted as planned. The same story reported
that German radio was quickly off the mark and was heard broadcasting that
its troops had counter-attacked and repelled the enemy, increasing British
losses in men and materiel hourly. It also claimed that Canadian Press corres-
pondent Ross Munro, accompanying the troops, had not been in touch with
his office for several days and that his absence paralleled the secret operation.
Munro, however, was embroiled in a futile battle with censorsY In addition,
Herald editors ran an analysis, by British United Press War Analyst Louis
F. Keemle, on the same page. He wrote that the Dieppe raid set a pattern
for the larger invasion to come and that the hour of liberation was not far
distant.34 Keemle had been nowhere near the front. He, nonetheless, said that
the striking thing about the action was the perfect co-ordination of the land,
sea, and air forces involved. In fact, he wrote, the air force cleared the way
by bombing communication lines and centres.35 That was simply wrong. Air
Marshall Arthur Harris refused to allow his heavy bombers to fly after dawn
and cancelled the planned heavy air bombardment.
Munro and the other correspondents, meanwhile, made their way to
Combined Operations upon their return to England, to file their stories.
After Munro's story cleared censors, it ran in hundreds of North American
newspapers. While alluding to casualties, saying that half the men on his
boat had been wounded; he lauded the Canadians' courage. Under a dateline
of August 19 (delayed), he wrote:
There was heroism at sea and in the skies in those hours, but the
hottest spot was ashore, where the Canadians fought at close
quarters with the Nazis. They fought to the end, where they had
to, and showed courage and daring.
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They attacked the Dieppe arsenal of coastal defence. They left
Dieppe silent and afire, its ruins and its dead under a shroud of
smoke.36
. His work was hailed as a masterpiece and one of the greatest stories of the
war.37 Elsewhere, Munro's and others' eyewitness accounts were lauded by
the New York Times as "rattling good" stories. "It is sensible of the authorities
to let him (the war correspondent) see for himself and to tell what he sees,"
the newspaper said.38 The problem was, like Max Aitken in the First World
War, Munro made no mention of the Canadians who had been slaughtered. It
could be suggested that he did no more or no less than what countless other
journalists who wrote about Dieppe did, focusing on the positive. and not
the negative. The salient difference between Munro and the rest, however,
was that he was the most experienced and knowledgeable of the lot. More
importantly, he was at Dieppe with Canadian soldiers dying all around him.
It was his stories that were reprinted throughout the Allied world. In 1946,
one year after the war ended, Munro admitted he knew at the time that the
raid on Dieppe had turned out much worse than he had written. He wrote:
"1 watched those boats in the warm s~nshinegoing back to England empty
when they should have been filled with the thousands of soldiers they'd
taken to France."39
. What could he have written? Munro accompanied the original train-
ing operations for the first July raid that was cancelled due to unfavourable
tides and knew the scope of the original plans, including air bombardment.
He also knew that the new plans were haphazard by comparison.40 Munro
had also seen plans to blow up a bridge linking Abbeville to Amiens, which
seemed comical to him.41 He knew what had convinced planners to go ahead
was misleading intelligence that German defences were comparatively thin
and manned by few first~rate troopS.42 He certainly knew the raid had gone
all wrong as far as the detail plan was concerned.43 Munro wrote nothing
of those things until four years after the raid. In an unapologetic afterword,
he said: "The correspondents who had gone to France with the Canadians
wearily sat down to write their stories. There were many things we could
not tell."44 Elsewhere, he reiterated that censorship restricted what he could
and could not write, but he argued that most of the time he was able to tell
a story validly despite the censorship. The one exception, he admitted, was
Dieppe. "1 never really felt, except maybe on the Dieppe raid, that I was really
cheating the public back home."45
The history is clear. The questions raised by the coverage of Dieppe are
why it happened that way and what lessons it may teach about the coverage
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of ensuing wars. To say Canada was fighting in an all-out war in which pa-
triotism had to over-ride journalistic integrity does not go far enough. That
journalists, even those in war zones decades later, are prone to rely heavily
on official military versions of events is well documented.46 This helps to ex-
plain the litany of erroneous propaganda that found its way into Canadian
newspapers at the hands of most journalists nowhere near the war zone <;1nd
by the handful that were.
It has been suggested, again, that, because Munro and the others lived
with the Canadian army, went on training courses and manoeuvres, wore
uniforms, and were well-known to soldiers and their families, it was unreal-
istic to expect them to write the truth about what happened at Dieppe.47 It
should be remembered, however, that, before the battle, they were charged
by the military to report the events honestly and fearlessly within the limita-
tions permitted by considerations of security. To write the truth about the
slaughter would not have been a breach of security because Canadian news-
papers eventually carried the truth about the growing numbers of casualties
as soon as it became available. Rather, it can be suggested that there were
forces at play, that journalistic integrity had been sacrificed on the altar of
patriotism.
The Korean War
Like the raid on Dieppe during the Second World War, the Battle of Kap'yong
on April 24, 1951, offers a rich case study of some of the news coverage of the
Korean War. The major difference between Dieppe and Kap'yong, however,
is that where Dieppe was an unmitigated disaster, the battle of Kap'yong
on Hill 677 was a stunning victory. The Sec<?nd Battalion Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) held its ground against a massive attack
by Chinese soldiers who outnumbered them three to one. The Chinese came
at them in waves and were cut down by the Patricia's Bren guns but still kept
coming. For their actions, the 2PPCLI were awarded a U.S. Presidential Unit
Citation. To this day, it is the only regiment in Canadian history to receive
that honour.48
The first news of the Chinese assault on nearby Australian positions was
reported from Tokyo in Associated Press stories on Tuesday, April 24, which
invariably identified the Chinese as "Red troops."49 One headline, which
would likely be considered highly politically incorrect by today's standards,
in the Globe and Mail that day screamed: "Mongol Hordes Spearhead Drive:
Reds Rip Gaping Hole in UN Line, Pour South."sO .
Not until Thursday, April 26, did details of the battle at Kap'yong begin
to emerge on Canada's west coast. The Vancouver Sun ran an Associated Press
11
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story on its front page datelined Tokyo with the headline "Reds Surge toward
Seoul." Inserted in the story were three paragraphs in brackets saying: "Bill
Boss, Canadian correspondent with the Canadian Battalion, in a dispatch
from the west-central sector reported seeing wave after wave of Chinese re-
pelled in a knock"down, drag out battle. Boss said the UN troops, which he
could not identify because of security regulations, were in the thick of the
Communist onslaught."S!
The same day, however, other Canadian newspapers carried two varia-
tions of a much longer story authored by Boss. The first is worth replicating
in its entirety for the astonishing battle details Boss captured. It was head-
lined in the Toronto Daily Star: "Outflanked, encircled Pats won't Quit, Beat
Back Reds, Hurl Rifles like spears."S2 It was datelined West Central Sector,
Korea, April 26 (CP):
The Chinese had enough. They withdrew. Throughout Tuesday
night and part of Wednesday, the Communist hordes attacked
U.N. positions on a steep hill in the west central sector of the
flaming Korea Front. They out flanked and encircled these troops
who until now had only met with token resistance as they ad-
vanced northward.
But, they failed to break a line held by such stalwarts as the
sergeant who flung his empty rifle like a spear into the face of the
enemy. Or the young company commander who coolly ordered
mortar and artillery fire on his own position when his men ran
out of ammunition.
(Boss covering the Princess Patricia's in Korea cannot mention
"Canadian Troops" or individuals he sees in action because of
censorship regulations.)
These troops held steady as rocks as the enemy masses as-
saulted their hill from the front, from the flanks and finally from
the rear where the flanks gave way under sheer weight of num-
bers. By 6 a.m. yesterday the enemy had had enough. He with-
drew down the hill and dug in.
But, he was only 100 yards away screened by a thick curtain of
smoke and building up for another attack.
I counted 17 dead Chinese within inches and feet of those
troops and approximately 50 graves of enemy buried in the heat
of battle. There were uncounted enemy dead where the intended
rear and flank attack was thwarted.
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It was a hard-won victory. Time and again the Chinese rushed
the UN. front line position and at one time the ammunition of one
defending company ran out. And then a young captain, fighting
his first action as company commander, ordered his men into slit
trenches and called for artillery and mortar fire on the hill.
For three hours, the guns of three field regiments and two
battalions of mortars rained down on the position as the captain
coolly gave fire directions. It was too much for the Chinese. They
moved back.
Wave upon wave, following the orders of whistles and bugles
to the split second, the enemy hordes surged in late Tuesday
night. It was suicidal, but it evoked this tribute from one sergeant:
"They're good. They were on top of our positions before we knew
it. They're quiet as mice with those rubber shoes. There's a whis-
tle. They get up about 10 feet from our positions and come in.
The first wave throws grenades, fires its weapons and goes to
the ground. As second does the same, and a third. They just keep
coming."
That was the sergeant who hurled his bayoneted rifle like a
spear when his ammunition gave out. Another hurled his bay-
onet at the foes. The sergeant's company held out by dividing the
slim remaining supply of ammunition until the enemy pressure
ended.
Supplied by Flying Boxcars
The young captain's company was supplied yesterday by "flying
boxcars" which made air drops of supplies.
(This portion of Boss's dispatch indicated the company was
isolated. Today's eighth Army communique reported that an
Allied tank battalion broke through and linked up with UN.
forces south of Karangpe.)
Boss said the UN. forces he was reporting were northeast of
Seoul. .And he added: "Look at any up-to-date battle map and
the thick burr of resistance to the Communist onslaught is in the
centre."
(Up-to-date Korean battle maps show that the stiffest fighting
is north east of Seoul, near Kap'yong, just south of the 38th parallel
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which divides North and South Korea. This is almost the centre
of the Korean battlefront.)53
The same story ran virtually word for word in the Calgary Herald, with a
shorter version on page 3 of the Vancouver Sun. A second version of the same
story ran the same day in The Albertan and the Globe and Mail, although the
Globe's byline identified him as William Boss. The only differences in the two
versions of the story are the opening five sentences in The Albertan and Globe
stories which read:
UN mountain warriors won their spurs today, holding their
front, refusing to budge though outflanked and encircled.
It was a knock-down, drag-out battle with wave upon wave of
Chinese Communists who did everything but drive them from
their positions.
These UN troops are on the west central sector north-east of
Seoul. Look at any up-to-date battle map and the thick burr of
resistance to the Communist onslaught is in the centre.
Cut off and encircled, these UN troops fought on and by late
morning today had cleared the enemy from their rear, had beaten
them off their flanks and held on their front. 54
What is interesting about the above stories is that all mention that Boss's report
was censored in ·one way or another. This comment contradicts Kesterton's
work that censorship was invoked only during the First and Second World
Wars. According to the news reports, censorship regulations prohibited him
from reporting that Canadians were involved, let alone specific battalions,
individuals, their hometowns, and the operations' or battles' locations. It is
also interesting to see how the newspapers got around the censorship. In
theatre, Boss could only identify the troops as UN troops, not as the Princess
Patricia's. The Albertan and the Globe and Mail, for example, both ran two
sentences above his story saying: "(Bill Boss, Canadian Press correspondent
with the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in Korea, writes the first
detailed report on Wednesday's. action. Under censorship regulations, he
cannot at the moment, mention Canadian troops, the Patricia's or the home
towns of any of the men he interviews.)"55 Presumably, the censorship was
not the full country-wide censorship invoked by the government during
the First and Second World Wars, but imposed by the military. While Boss
honoured that censorship, the newspapers did not. One cannot envision the
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government invoking censorship and then having it so flagrantly violated.
The Toronto Daily Star even went so far as to consult battle maps and correctly
identify, in violation of the censorship, Kap'yong, just south of the 38th paral-
lel dividing North and South Korea, as the area where the battle took place.
One wonders why the military even bothered to censor locations because it
was already clearly apparent that the Chinese troops already knew where
the UN troops were when they attacked. In the early 1950s, the idea that such
information could be related to the enemy in a timely and strategic fashion
is preposterous.
Of the newspapers examined, only the Halifax Chronicle-Herald did not
use a version of Boss's story, instead running an Associated Press article date-
lined Tokyo.56 Presumably the four-hour time difference between Vancouver
and Halifax paper's deadlines precluded access to the Boss story.
Particularly striking about Boss's reports is how close he was to the
battle. He was able to count dead bodies, witness soldiers calling in mortar
.fire on their positions, and observe soldiers throwing their rifle and bayonets
at the enemy. This is a far cry from Max Aitken's reporting from London
during the First World War and is far more in line with the risks the journal-
ists, including Ross Munro, took during the Dieppe Raid during the Second
World War. They risked their lives and limbs for their stories, regardless of
the final product. Not just anyone would do that.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War
The origins of the ground rules that limit what journalists may write about
in Afghanistan can be found in an elaborate communications strategy de-
veloped in November, 1990, for journalists travelling on Canadian ships dur-
ing the Persian Gulf War, the world's first real-time televised war.57
In the months leading up to the war, the Canadian Forces viewed the im-
pending conflict as an opportunity to build popular support for the military.
Internal military documents obtained using the 1985 Access to Information Act,
show the military anticipated "maximum disclosure of information consist-
ent with maintaining the operational security of Canada's forces and those of
other allied nations participating in the Gulf operationS."SB In its after-action
report on its public affairs planning, the Canadian military states that they
knew the news media would play an influential role in that communications
strategy because the journalists would be the key conveyors of information
about, and interpreters of, the war's events to the Canadian public.59 This
report also shows that military public affairs planners made every effort to




The first external audience the Forces hoped to target in communication
thrusts, via news releases, public briefings, the news media, debates in the
House of Commons, and in replies to ministe'rial questions and inquiries,
was the Canadian public. The Forces' second target was the news media,
which it planned to stimulate through background briefings, news releases,
query responses, and operational theatre visits. The third target audience
was elected officials, who would be reached via briefings, questions in the
House of Commons, and committee presentations, and through various
elected officials' visits to operational theatres. The fourth target audience
was Canadian academics, whom the military planned to reach through back-
ground and technical briefings. The fifth audience identified was defence
analysts who would be reached through technical and background briefings.
The sixth audience was ethnic Canadians who would be informed through
media reports and public briefings. Finally, the seventh external audience
was international publics that would be reached through for~ign missions
and briefings and assistance to international journalists.60
With respect to the news media in particular, the policy was based on
operational requirements, as represented by the Forces. It specified:
a. Within the scope of operational security, media will be ac-
corded every possible assistance in the preparation and fil-
ing of their reports;
b. Censorship will not be invoked by DND or by
CANFORCOMME. The imposition of censorship can only
be derived from censorship policy of the Canadian govern-
ment. Therefore, it is paramount that a good working rela-
tionship with the news media be established to ensure they
understand the necessity to voluntarily comply with in-
theatre security screening guidelines. Accordingly, media
covering the roles, operations and activities of the Canadian
Forces Middle East should be prepared to submit their copy
for security screening only;
c. There will be no suggestion that media expunge critical
commentary from their reports unless there is an impact on
security of operations;
d. Before they are provided access to in-theatre operations,
all media are to be provided unclassified briefings about
Canadian Forces operations and activities in the Persian
Gulf, security considerations and requirements, and what
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is expected of them while they are visiting CANFORME
units;
e. Media embarked in liMC ships may use ships' commu-
nications resources, when appropriate and available. The
Canadian Forces will provide protective clothing and equip-
ment to media representatives when they are embarked in
HMC ships;
f. All interviews with news media representatives will be 'on
the record';
g. Journalists will be requested to dateline their articles and
reports generically, such as "... with the Canadian Forces in
Bahrain/Qatar/Persian Gulf." No specific locations will be
used when filing stories;
h. Media representatives will be assisted by on-site public af-
fairs officers;
j. Diplomatic clearances, visa and inoculations will be the re-
sponsibility of the media members; and,
k. Media who are not prepared to work within these guide-
lines will not be provided access to CANFORME opera-
tions, activities and units.61
Journalists were required to accept these guidelines in order to be accredited.
Despite the military's claim that it wanted to be as transparent as possible,
the news media howled over the restrictions placed on them, referring to
them as "censorship guidelines." For example, the Globe and Mail reported
on January 19, 1991, that military censors aboard Canadian ships reviewed
journalists' stories to determine whether information in them could jeopard-
ize operational security, while guidelines mirrored U.S. Defense Department
guidelines on the prohibition of information that would reveal military oper-
ations' details, size, location or movement.62
In its lessons-learned analysis of its news-media management, the
policy's authors wrestled with the two conflicting imperatives of their practi-
ces: openness and candor versus operational security: It recommended: "We
should standardize with our allies who have had more operational experi-
ence than we haye and adopt their more liberal release of info policies."63
The 1999 Kosovo Air War
Some eight years after the Persian Gulf Lessons Learned report was writ-
ten during the 1999 Kosovo Air War, the Canadian Forces ignored its own
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recommendations to adopt a more liberal release of operational information.
University of Leeds scholar Philip M. Taylor predicted, in 1995, that despite
rapid advances in communications technologies, militaries had two means
to effectively censor the modern news media during a conflict. First, access to
troops could be denied altogether and, second, military leaders could control
messages about the conflicts by inserting themselves into the news-gath-
ering process.64 Air wars, particularly, lend themselves to such censorship
quite nicely because it is impossible for journalists to accompany pilots on
combat missions. As a result, crews can only be interviewed before or after
their missions and cockpit footage of bombs being released might possibly
be obtained.65 Taylor predicted, however, that what such images could not
convey were the "sounds, sight, smell, touch, and taste of the nasty, brutal
business of people killing people" which would frighten, appall, and repel
most people. "That reality of war evades media war."66
During the Kosovo Air War, both censorship techniques were used.
News media who travelled Aviano, Italy, to report on the Canadian air force
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's seventy-eight-day
bombing campaign, were not permitted on the American air base. Completely
denied access to the Canadian crews, the news media members had to rely on
the goodwill of the Task Force Aviano commander, Colonel Dwight Davies,
which was in short supply.67 Davies had no time for the news media whom
he thought belittled the efforts of his air crews, questioning their proficiency
at hitting targets.68 He also believed, wrongly, that Canadian pilots identified
in news reports during the 1991 Gulf War had body bags thrown on their
families' lawns by protestors opposed to the war. As a result, he would not
let the few pilots who eventually did speak to reporters identify themselves
or discuss details of their missions.
The Canadian Forces staged daily news briefings on the progress of
the war, but they contained very little specific information about operations
and no accounts of missions' successes or failures. During one briefing, the
most high-profile interview of the campaign, journalists in Ottawa talked to
one unidentified Canadian CF-18 pilot in Aviano via a telephone conference
call about his feelings about flying into combat for the first time, but little
else.69 Effectively, all life was stripped out of the journalists' few reports from
Aviano, print or television. In Ottawa, "operational security" was invoked
time and again as a reason for not releasing information, ludicrously at times.
The June 1, 1999, briefing was indicative of how "operational security" came
into play. One journalist tried to get a sense of what the Canadians were doing
in the bombing campaign by learning about the number of bombs dropped.
He was stonewalled by Chief of Joint Operations Brigadier General David
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Jurkowski on the grounds of security. The reporter wanted to know the cost
of the weapons dropped to date, and Jurkowski replied: "That could lead one
to think about the number of weapons and by way of policy and security, we
don't talk about the number of weapons employed."70 The journalist pressed
further, wanting to know why the number of bombs was a security issue
and arguing that Canadians had a right to know the cash value of munitions
dropped. Jurkowski replied: "I have those numbers for you right now and for
security reasons, I'm not going to address it any further."71
This line of questioning was dropped until the next day when Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant General Ray Henault was asked about the
cost of bombs. Henault went on the offensive telling the journalists: "We have
been, I think, fairly open. In fact, very open throughout this whole process
now at seventy-one days of giving you briefings daily so I think our process
has been very open and transparent, probably in a way unprecedented in
the past."n Henault then contradicted Jurkowski's previous argument by di-
vulging that $20 million had been spent on Operation Echo, of which 45 per
cent was on bomhs.73 The journalists did not question the inconsistency in
security considerations - why precise information was withheld for security
reasons one day, and was not a security issue the next.
In the end, a content analysis of the entire daily news media coverage
in Canada of the seventy-eight-day war including both print and television,
revealed that nearly 60 per cent had two sentences or less about the CF-18s'
involvemerit. Slightly more than 75 per cent had six sentences or less. Not
much can be learned about a war in six sentences or less.74
Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act reveal that the
Canadian Forces' lessons-learned report of the news media coverage of the
.Kosovo Air War did not analyze the success or failure of the Canadian Forces
public affairs policy and practices, as had the lessons-learned report on the
1991 Gulf War. Rather, that campaign was assessed specifically to illustrate
the ethical dilemmas it presented for the media and public's right to know
versus operational security and care of personnel. The language is cryptic
in that it avoids specifics and, in the end, paints a self-serving picture of its
public-affairs practices.75 It reads:
The subject of military security vs embarrassing information
vs the public right to know will become a routine dilemma in
future operations. The Kosovo campaign example of providing
constant media briefings and the strategy reflecting candor, truth
and disclosure to the extent possible would appear to represent
a strategy that fulfills our obligations of public disclosure and
should serve to build public trust and confidence. Decisions to
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fully and promptly report any incident similar to the Chinese
embassy bombing in Serbia are seen as consistent with defence
ethical values. The questions of 'What to report?' will always re-
quire a balancing of values, security issues and the ethic of care
(morale) of our people.76
While the report claimed that daily briefings were a model for public dis-
closure, balancing operational security concerns with the public's right to
know, in reality, there was no balance at all. The 1991 recommendation that
Canada adopt the more liberal release of information policies of their more
operationally experienced allies was ignored. Worse, the "operational secur-
ity" reason which the Forces used to undermine any democratic role for the
news media during the 1999 air war was based on myth. Many air force com-
manders believed that the families of Canadian airmen during the 1991 Gulf
war, identified in news media reports, had body bags dumped on their lawns
in a bid to intimidate those serving overseas. That never happened. A myth
should not have driven operational security concerns that undermined the
democratic role of the news media during war, but it did. And, as a result of
it, the Canadian public knows nothing about Canada's involvement in the
Kosovo Air War. It is an information black hole. Canadians deserve much
better.
Kabul, Afghanistan
Canadians have been deploying to Afghanistan since February 2002. It was
abundantly clear very early on from the Canada military's own analyses of
the news media's coverage of the Afghanistan conflict that the Canadian
Forces study the news media, learn lessons about it - even if at times the
lessons are ignored - and write about it in a scholarly fashion in refereed
journals. This accumulated body of wisdom is thus diffused throughout
the command chain of the Forces in order to better manage the media. They
work from a 123-page Public Affairs Handbook, first developed on January 15,
1974, amended in September 1985, and amended again in March 1999, spe-
cifically intended to control all manner of messages and images that could
affect how the Forces appear publicly, including in the news media.77 There
is no equivalent document in Canadian newsrooms or journalism schools.
The most comprehensive guide that journalists have which deals with the
Canadian Forcesis comprised of five pages in The Canadian Press Stylebook.
It sets out the proper way to refer to the Forces, where headquarters are, the
proper way to use titles and ranks before a name, how to refer to retired
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officers, that courts martial are open to the media, a section on ceremonies
. and miscellaneous information which includes the tidbit that Canadians do
not go to boot camp, they take basic training.78
The military's scholarly approach to the news media is no more evident
than in a Fall/Winter 2004 article in the Canadian Army Journal by Major Jay
Janzen, which examines the nature of the relationship between the news
media and the military from Rotation Zero (ROTa 0) of Operation Athena
in the summer of 2003 when Canadian journalists were embedded w:ith
the 3 Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) Battalion Group based out of Kabul, .
Afghanistan.
That relationship was based on a ground rules agreement, founded on
the American experience in Iraq, established to manage the journalists who
would be hosted by the 3 RCR.79 The Canadian military learned that there
were big differences between the American concept of embedding in Iraq
and the Canadians' Afghanistan experience. In the Iraq war, for example,
individual journalists were assigned to specific units for the duration; eating,
sleeping, and travelling with the same unit for months, receiving briefings
from platoon or company commanders with scant public affairs experience.8o
As a result, they had little contact with public affairs officers or senior com-
manders who lost their ability to influence the journalists from a strategic
perspective.81
The Canadian journalists, meanwhile, were based at Camp Julian in
separate living quarters from the troops. There were eight journalists from
five different media organizations in regular contact with public affairs and
senior officers. The latter learned, as an effective media relations tactic, that
by being proactive with journalists, they could influence what they covered.
Major Janzen explained:
On many occasions, senior officers would join members of· the
media for meals or a cup of coffee. These impromptu gather-
ings suggested to journalists that they were not regarded as an
inconvenience or something to be avoided. Further, it. gave both
parties an opportunity to hold informal discussions that would
often lead to positive story ideas being passed to journalists.
Many company commanders also sought out journalists when
their troops were about to embark on interesting or important
missions. Reporters appreciated being given information on up-
coming activities rather than having to discover it on their own.
By pushing information to the media, the battalion was also able
to exercise some influence over what journalists'decided to cover.
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When an opportunity to cover a mission or event was proactively
presented to a reporter, it almost always received coverage.82
Major Janzen wrote that it was preferable, from the military's point of view, to
have journalists remain in theatre for extended period because interactions
with them tended to be more cordial than with those who remained for only
short periods of time, or who chose not to be embedded. Non-embedded
journalists, who did not sign the embedding agreement, often called "unilat-
eral" journalists, sometimes just came and went or lived off camp. Anywhere
off camp is routinely referred to as "outside the wire." It was better to have
embedded journalists with Canadian troops rather than unilaterals. Senior
officers personally welcomed the embedded journalists, and pro-actively
pursued professional relations with them, ensuring a high-level of support
by informing them of potential story oppo.rtunities. The benefit, it was said,
was that the media were properly informed. In the end, clear preference was
given to journalists who embedded for extended periods of time.83
Even then, it was not possible to accommodate all the journalists who
wanted to be embedded within rifle companies on operations because there
were only three such units. The solution was to develop a rotating schedule,
which did not facilitate the building of solid relationships between soldiers
and journalists. A similar problem emerged with allowing journalists to
cover operations in such small vehicle patrols as the litis because three of its
four seats had to go to military members. Some journalists from larger or-
ganizations even rented their own vehicles to accompany the soldiers when
possible.84
The s~gle biggest problem, documented by Major Janzen, was disputes
over access the media had to information that the Forces deemed forbidden
to them for reasons of operational security. Janzen notes the news media
members were routinely briefed on impending operations and were provid-
ed sensitive material to help them understand and report to Canadians about
the overall mission being conducted by the Canadian military in Kabul, but
were not allowed to report on them until authorized by unit commanders.
During ROTO 0 of Op ATHENA, members of the media had a moderate
level of. access to operational information. However, they were uncertain "as
to whether they could even mention simple information such as the name
of a vehicle or an approximation of how many soldiers were in the 3 RCR
Battalion Group. Many of these concerns were alleviated by when public
affairs staff at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa produced theatre-
specific ground rules in November 2003, based on the 1991 media policies,
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as well as comprehensive briefings to better define the boundaries between
releasable and non-releasable information.
Embedded journalists were required to sign the ground rules agree-
ment, which was far more restrictive than that for the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
which the news media of the day claimed was censorship. While this agree-
ment did not require the media covering the roles, operations, and activities
of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan to submit their copy for security
screel}ing, unlike th~ 1991 agreement, it did provide nineteen categories of
information that could not be released unless specifically approved by the
Task Force Commander and ten categories that could. Among the eminently
reasonable information that could not be reported was "specific information
on troop strength, equipment or critical supplies (e.g., artillery, radars, trucks
water, etc.)" and "information on future operations, current operations,
postponed or cancelled operations" and th~ like.8s Among those that could
be reported were the "arrival of military units in the area when officially
announced," and "non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding air and
ground operations, past and present" and, lastly, the laughable "weather and
climate conditions" category.86 No responsible journalist would report on
future operations. The public's right to know is not worth risking the life of
even one soldier. But, the ground rules set out in 2003 trivialized the work
of serious journalists risking their lives in Afghanistan, when the Canadian
Forces operational-security-minded brain trust in Ottawa cleared them to
report on the weather. (See Appendix One for a complete list of the releasable
and non-releasable information developed for use in 2003.)
Without being specific, Major Janzen wrote that journalists were gen-
erally trustworthy regarding operational security when the rationale for
restricting. certain information was explained to them. But, many became
impatient when, for example, there were rocket attacks against Camp"Julien
where they were based. They would leave their assigned protected areas
seeking imagery, sounds, and impressions of the event, eventually forcing
them to be placed under the escort of a public affairs officer. Further, the
journalists were not told about highly sensitive operations such as the po-
tential arrest of terrorists or contingency plans for the Afghan government's
defence, because the potential for security breaches was extreme.87 The
problem with that approach, Janzen noted, was that Canadians reading or
watching the news at home "can be left with impression the Canadian Forces
are involved in a soft peacekeeping mission, when in fact troops are being
deployed on some dangerous and sensitive missions."88 The challenge, he
wrote, was to strike a balance so the media could report on aspects of the
missions while maintaining elevated levels of operational security. In the
end, Janzen concluded that, overall, with only a few periods of tension, the
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embedding program was successful, thanks to an "outstanding commitment
of the chain of command at all levels to support journalists in their efforts to
cover the operation."89
Canadian journalists simply do not access the Canadian Forces in the
scholarly fashion that the military studies them. There are no peer-reviewed
journals to which they contribute reflections on their success or failure as
an industry to cover the 1991 Persian Gulf War or the 1999 Kosovo Air War.
Having said that, despite Major Janzen's upbeat assessment of the embedding
program in the Canadian Army Journal, the Canadian Press's Stephen Thorne,
a member of the Canadian War Correspondents Association (CW.CA.), said
the wheels were falling off the embedding program while he was in Kabul
between 2003 and 2004. He claimed, in the Fall 2004 CW.CA. newsletter,
then Lieutenant General Rick Hillier, who commanded the International
Security Assistance Force between February and August, 2004; and Brigadier
General Jocelyn Lacroix, who was commander of the Kabul Multi-National
Brigade, denied media access to Canadian Forces operating with Afghans
when they apprehended terrorists believed responsible for a mine strike that
killed two Canadians in October 2003, in addition to seizing weapons caches
and explosives. Instead, Thorne claimed the generals wanted the journalists
to cover "routine patrols, goodwill projects and base politics" which grossly
misrepresented Canadians' Afghan role.90 Thorne explained that operational
security had no bearing on Hillier's reticence in that regard:
In a meeting soon after I arrived in Kabul last March, Hillier told
me his concerns had "nothing to do with operational security."
He said the decision was a political one, based partly on the
sensitivities of other NATO participants and on the fact the ISAF
leadership didn't like the way the earlier raids had been covered.
Canadian troops got way too much credit for the arrests and seiz-
ures at several area compounds last spring, Hillier said. He said
one of the aims of such operations was to put Afghan police and
national security forc~s at the forefront of operations. He said the
credibility and legitimacy of ISAF and the Afghan government
depended on the appearance that Afghan forces were capable of
handling their own affairs - even if ISAF backup was required.91
According to Thorne, about a month later, General Hillier recanted his pol-
itical argument, claiming his concern over the news media coverage was
based on operational security. He wrote:
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The Vandoos' leadership actually believed that Canadian news-
paper coverage of a raid involving the Royal Canadian Regiment
in January was responsible for a suicide bombing. Other soldiers
told me this could not have been true - that it was evident that
the bombing had been very carefully planned and it would have
been impossible for anyone to have organized it so quickly;
they also said it was evident it was an attack on ISAF, not on the
Canadians specifically. Not to mention the fact that spies ~ and
cell phones - are everywhere in Afghanistan and news travels
faster than any news service could ever hope.92
As a result, Thorne wrote, although the news media were ostensibly to have
privileged access to the troops and their operations as result of the media
embedding program, in reality, the embeds were "often the last to hear about
anything that happened at brigade or ISAF headquarters."93 While Thorne
is critical of Hillier, Lacroix, and Captain Bernard Dionne, a public affairs
officer, the most valuable contribution his piece makes is to show a marked
difference in various soldiers' attitudes and· commitment toward preserv-
ing one of the most basic democratic values - a free press. In that regard,
he singled out Major Janzen, Major Luc Gaudet, Captain Richard Langlois,
Captain Mike Mailloux, and Lieutenant Colonel Roland Lavoix as "pillars of
co-operation, hard work and professionalism who appeared to respect the
embedding program, were committed to it and understood the job that the
media were there to do."94
In March 2006, the Toronto Star's Mitch Potter broke new ground in the
media's coverage of conflict through the detail he provided of a horrific axe
attack on Lt. Trevor Greene, who was part of a Canadian Forces Civil-Military
Co-operation (CIMIC) platoon visiting a destitute Afghan village, which the
Star could not identify for security reasons.95 As part of CIMIC's outreach,
Greene - a Vancouver reservist attached to the Princess Patricia's Canadian
Light Infantry's First Platoon of Alpha Company - had removed his helmet,
laid down his weapon, and sat on the ground with village elders in a March 4
"shura" or meeting, in an attempt to build bridges and determine their needs.
Out of nowhere, a young man, less than twenty years old, brandishing a hid-
den axe, swung it into the top of Green's head. Potter was embedded with
the platoon. Although he was elsewhere in the village and did not witness
the attack, he nevertheless was able to directly interview platoon members,
including Commander Captain Keven Schamuhn who sat next to Greene in
the meeting and who saw the attack take place. The following is part of his
exclusive report in the Sunday Star on March 5:
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"I began the conversation with an introduction and turned things
over to Trevor (Greene). He was asking about whether the village
had a school when the attack came."
Schamuhn said he caught a peripheral glimpse of the attacker
raising his arm, but was unable to see what was in his hands. A
moment later, he watched in horror as the man shouted "Allahu
Akbar" (God is great) and swung the axe down on Greene.
"I could see the poison in his eyes," Schamuhn said of the at-
tacker. "His eyes were bulging out. And after he swung the axe,
he stood there frozen. He knew what was about to happen."
Schamuhn and two other Canadian soldiers standing metres
away reached for their weapons.
Sgt. Rob Dolson, a nine-year veteran of Alpha Company, was
first to respond, firing into the assailant, who stumbled but did
not fall. Schamuhn and Pte. Matt McFadden foiIowed up with
bursts from their C8 semi-automatic assault rifles.
The attacker dropped to the ground, his body rolling down
the slope toward the river.96
Altogether, the three soldiers fired fourteen rounds into the attacker.97 The
embedding agreement in place at the time placed no control over the reports
of incidents eye-witnessed by reporters. But, when other embedded journal-
ists at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) learned of the attack on Greene, they also
wanted an opportunity to interview the soldiers. Canadian Forces public
affairs officers subsequently arranged a teleconference call with Captain
Schamuhn who provided a highly emotional and detailed account of the at-
tack, including the names of the soldiers who killed the assailant and how
many shots were fired. That was too much information for the public affairs
advisors, who embargoed the details on the grounds that they put those sol-
diers at risk or violated individual privacy. As a result of the embargo, which
the public affairs officers could invoke under the embedding agreement,
the nasty, brutal business of Canadian soldiers killing an enemy evaded
Canadians in reports filed by all the journalists except for the Star's Potter
and Cahadian Press's Les Perreaux. Perreaux in the Chronicle-Herald and the
Winnipeg Free Press identified Schamuhn as one of three soldiers who fired
at the assailant, killing him instantly. This was at odds with the Star's report




Canadian public affairs officer Captain (N) Chris Henderson explained
his thinking about the way the media was managed in the Greene attack
in the Spring 2006 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. Henderson also
offered his thoughts on amendments to the media embedding guidelines so
to further restrict journalists when Canadian Forces killed the enemy in the
future, once again illustrating the military's highly sophisticated scholarly
approach to managing the news media.
The March 4 axe attack on Captain Trevor Greene brought two
such amendments into focus. As described above, the attacker
in that incident was shot dead by Canadian Forces personnel.
Following a request from media embedded at Kandahar Air
Field, and thus physically removed from the soldiers involved, a
teleconference call was conducted with the platoon commander,
Captain Kevin Schamuhn. The interview was evocative, emo-
tional and highly detailed, including the names of the soldiers
who killed the assailant, the number of shots they fired, as well
as a description of Capt. Greene and his vital signs following the
attack. This resulted in a decision to embargo certain elements of
the interview as they were deemed to put the involved soldiers
at risk or to violate the privacy of an individual. This suggests
an amendment to the embedding rules that would preclude the
naming of soldiers involved in actions resulting in the death
of enemy fighters and insurgents or friendly forces and/or the
specific details of such an action that are precluded by the rest
of the media embedding guidelines. Further analysis is needed
to resolve this question if soldiers themselves wish to speak with
the media.
This incident also underscored the necessity to insulate sol-
diers involved in combat operatioDs from media contact in the
. immediate aftermath of that action. While there is no standard
or recommended period of exclusion from a mental health per-
spective, media contact should be avoided at least until affected
soldiers receive critical incident stress debriefing - should the
chain of command deem such a debriefing necessary. If there is
no critical incident stress debriefing, the chain of command must
make an assessment of the soldiers' capacity to conduct media
interviews while remaining within the bounds of operational
security and propriety. Public affairs officers must be available to
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provide their advice to the chain of command, and assist in pre-
paring interview subjects if appropriate. This additional rigour
is not intended to override the extant CF policy governing pub-
lic affairs, DAOD 2008. However, in situations involving death
or injury, additional steps appear necessary to protect both the
soldiers and operational security.99
Henderson's article refers to Mitch Potter's article in the Toronto Star, which
named Captain Schamuhn, Sergeant Dolson, and Private McFadden, along
with the number of shots fired and when. Whether their identification in
a newspaper half a world away would violate operational security and put
them at greater risk from largely illiterate enemies who do not speak English
is debatable. Privacy, however, could be an issue. It is reasonable to sug-
gest that the soldiers who killed Greene's assailant should be unidentified
for privacy considerations. But to embargo the number of shots fired and
how in that instance or any other in the interest of "operational security"
is not reasonable. Its only effect is to rob Canadians of any insight into how
professionally their soldiers performed in horrific wartime circumstances.
Canadians deserve to know that. Canadians need to know, not only how
Canadian soldiers are killed, but how well they are trained and how well
they perform. The details are grim, but if Canadians can stomach seeing
pictures of blood-drenched corpses and victims being hauled out of build-
ings in Mumbai following the November 26, 2008, terrorist attack, they can
stomach the thought of Canadian soldiers killing and being killed. The line
could be drawn at pictures of Canadian bodies, but otherwise they see worse
in movies. Our soldiers are fighting a war in Afghanistan. Canadians need to
understand that and eyes are so much more open than minds.
The other point that must be made in a scholarly fashion about Captain
Henderson's article in the Canadian Military Journal is that journalists do not
address such important matters that have a direct bearing on their work.
That difference is what makes soldiering a profession and journalism a craft
- a craft of a higher calling, it should be said, but a craft nonetheless. It will
be shown in due course how the Canadian Forces responded to the recom-
mendations in Henderson's article.
A number of prominent Canadian journalists have criticized the media
embedding program as it existed in their tenure, which merits examination
of their experiences in Afghanistan. Rosie DiManno and Mitch Potter, of
the Toronto Star, questioned in April 2006 whether journalists could be fully
independent while embedded with the Canadian Forces, but lamented that
they had little choice due to the dangers in Kandahar:
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Canadian soldiers are there in a new and difficult hybrid role
- sometime combatants, sometime diplomats. Journalists want
Canadians to know whether the strategy is working and at what
cost. The military wants its story told as well. What are the op-
tions for journalists who want to do that? In Kandahar, escalat'-
ing dangers so limit Western journalists' movements that the
risks can outweigh the benefits of being there as an independent
observer. The military offers access, security, information, tech-
nical backup and arguably the only chance right now to cover the
Canadian Forces there.lOG
That reality, coupled with the fact that the Canadian Forces does not want
information published on current operations, weighed heavily upon David
Walmsley, the Star's assistant managing editor for national and foreign news,
but he was able to rationalize holding off on the reporting of breaking news
so long as the fact was explained to the newspaper's readers.
The military does not want published information to jeopardize
a current operation. Reporters may be aware of military plans
and might even accompany troops/ but the story will not be told
until the operation is over. "The issue is more timing than censor-
ship/" Walmsley said, adding that the short-term disadvantage
of a delay in informing readers is worth the longer-term benefit
of giving readers the additional information and detail possible
because a reporter was there. And so the line between giving and
withholding information is paced constantly. In fairness to the
readers, it is also essential that every story written by an embed-
ded reporter include a line that explains this is so - a practice
which has been unevenly applied.101
DiManno was quoted in the article as saying she would much rather be a
unilateral than an embedded reporter and thought the best solution, as did
Potter, was to have two reporters on the ground: one embedded and one uni-
lateral so to report all dimensions. The Globe and Mail's Christie Blatchford
also wrote about embedding in 2006 and took a tongue-in-cheek swipe at
Lawrence Martin, a Globe colleague, who questioned embedded journal-
ists/ ability to deliver the news with a "50-50" balance of objectivity. She
argued there is no difference between embedded journalists holding back
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information and Ottawa's Parliamentary journalists embargoed from re-
porting budget details on budget day. She wrote:
Dear God, you want to talk about embedding, honey? Now, Laurie
is more of an independent crank than most but Ottawa-centric
reporting, where journalists, bureaucrats, mandarins, lobbyists
and MPs share small and oft-overlapping social circles - not to
mention the guiding belief that a fart from one of their own is
inherently more interesting and important than, oh, a flood in
the dreary Prairies - is a more insidious form of embedding than
what my colleagues and I were doing in Afghanistan....
Now, there is some terrific reporting that comes out of the
nation's capital (this is my version of Mr. Martin's patronizing
bone to the effect that some embedded reporters do, you know,
good work) but a much bigger whackof it is press-release, press-
conference, media-staged, event-driven hooey....
At least reporters embedded with the military sign off on the
deal. We know what we are for the duration of our stint, and so
does the military: It's a straight-up arrangement. In exchange for
gaining unusual access to the troops, we agree not to publish
certain kinds of information (precise numbers of soldiers·on the
ground, pictures of military installations), we ,agree to certain
kinds of temporary embargoes (we get briefed in advance on par-
ticular missions'. for instance, but sometimes have to wait until
the soldiers get safely in place before publishing - gee, just like
budget day in Ottawa!) and to abide by the military's rules.102
Blatchford also addressed a new phenomenon in Afghanistan: the phenom-
enon of "fixers" reporting the news. Fixers in journalism are not new. These
are local residents hired to help as drivers and translators and for their know-
ledge and contacts. Some fixers in Afghanistan have contacts in the govern-
ment of Hamid Karzai, others with warlords and the Taliban; A good fixer
in Afghanistan can command up to $1,500 a, month, a fortune in a country
where the average annual income in 2006 was $250.103
The new phenomenon taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq to which
Blatchford referred, however, is the practice of fixers going alone to places
where it is far too dangerous for Western reporters to venture and, in effect,
becoming the reporter/photographer/cameraperson. She said: "This in itself
is weird and unsettling journalism because in practice what it sometimes
means in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq is that fixers go places with
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their cameras that are too dangerous for Western reporters, with the result
that we then rely on the fixers' eyes and ears, not to mention their common
fetish for close-ups of the dead, and not on our own."104
This important issue raises ethical questions. Without a Western repor-
ter, it is not possible to say with certainty whom the fixers' sources are. Are
they family or friends? How representative are such sources? Are the fixers'
ethics on par with those of Canadian journalists? Could the information have
been gathered any other way? On the other hand, Afghanistan remains one
of the most dangerous places in the world for a journalist to work independ-
ently; should new rules apply for fixers just as new rules do for embedded
journalists?
A footnote to Ms. Blatchford's April 8 thoughts on the embedding pro-
gram is that she did not discuss an incident that happened to her on April
2, when she, photographer Louie Palu, Toronto Star columnist Dimanno, and
Ontario-based freelance filmmaker Richard Fitoussi were removed from ac-
companying Canadian Forces after complaints from allies. The four were at-
tached to the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry battle group, which was oper-
ating with the U.S. Special Forces, who complained about their presence. The
Canadian Press obtained information about the incident nearly eight months
later, in December, using the Access t~ Information Act. In a subsequent story,
Canadian Press's Jeff Esau wrote that filmmaker Fitoussi said that, at the
time, they were told they were being evacuated for their own safety. In real-
ity, unidentified allies had complained about their presence. Esau talked to
military officials in Ottawa who told him that "placating Canada's allies will
always take precedence over the embedding program. 'Our allies having full
confidence in working with Canadians in all operations trumps embeds be- .
ing on those operations."'lOS There is little doubt the journalists would have
written about their removal had they known it was not for their own safety
- and they do have to trust the Forces on safety issues. But there is also little
doubt the Forces will mislead journalists if it suits its purpose.
Meanwhile, Blatchford's Globe colleague, Geoffrey York, spent four weeks
embedded with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan in May of 2006. He ap-
proached the assignment with a healthly dose of skepticism. York is an elder
statesman of conflict reporting, with more that fifteen years of experience
covering conflicts such as the Russians in Chechnya, the Americans in Iraq,
and the Canadians in Somalia. He was also one of the journalists completely
shut out of the Canadian operations in Aviano, Italy, during the Kosovo Air
War in 1999. He always prefers to work as independently as possible as a so-
called unilateral because he thinks that the military tends to be. a small part
of a greater story of human tragedy and national anguish. He wrote:
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The embedding experience had appeared, to me, to be a narrow
and restricted way to approach a war zone. So I was skeptical
about my assignment in Kandahar last month. Four weeks em-
bedded on a military base? Was it the right way to cover Canada's
role in Afghanistan?
The Globe's editors had wrestled with the same questions, Of
course, and ultimately we decided that we needed to be embed-
ded to stay close to Canada's troops. But for me, it was also a
personal quandary. After seeing the benefits of independence in
every other war zone, could I handle the restrictions and censor-
ship of embedded life?106
It did not take long for York to run straight into the wall of operational secur-
ity. Within a just a few days, he discovered the power handed over to military
public affairs officers as a result of him signing the embedding agreement.
He explained:
It was long after nightfall at the Kandahar Air Field, and I had
already told my editor about the article that I planned to write.
Then the Canadian military spokesman marched into my tent
with a curt announcement: He was killing the story.
He acknowledged. that the story was accurate and truthful
and that another Canadian spokesman had already confirmed
the facts of it. But he uttered two magic words - "operational se-
curity" - and announced that the media were not permitted to
publish the story. It had to die.
And what was that story I was forced to kill? A report that
Canadian troops had shifted away from a forward operating
base - something that must have already been obvious to any
resistance fighters paying any attention to the place. And even if
they weren't, it's hard to imagine that the Taliban would pick up
military secrets from the pages of a Canadian newspaper. 107
York wrote that he ended up with mixed feelings about his embedding ex-
perience in Kandahar and that the assignment was more complicated than
he anticipated. And, like the Canadian Press's Stephen Thorne before him,
the amount of discretionary power wielded by public affairs officers and
their commanders varied widely from soldier to soldier.
32
DR. ROBERT BERGEN
Yes, there was censorship - sometimes for reasons that seemed
inexplicable. Yes, there were heavy-handed attempts to control
the story, to suppress photos, to spin. messages and to deny re-
ality. But there was something endearingly Canadian about it
all. Our spin doctors just couldn't manage the ruthlessness of a
Pentagon media campaign.
Despite all the stonewalling instincts of their Ottawa masters,
the Canadian soldiers were unable to suppress their own sincer-
ify and honesty - their genuine belief that they were doing good
work for humanity and the media should be allowed the freedom
to see it.
I felt a little sorry for the hard-working military spokesmen -
decent guys like Major Mario Couture and Major Marc Theriault
- who were caught between the conflicting demands of the pushy
journalists and the evasive military commanders. They struggled
to persuade their bosses to make statements to the press, but they
were fighting an entrenched bureaucracy, infected with Ottawa's
penchant for secrecy and timidity.
The great advantage of embedding is the chance to see
Canada's soldiers at work, and the chance to help our readers
understand the future of their military - a new mandate that
combines the traditional warrior role and an emerging humani-
tarian role. Canada's rank-and-file soldiers are mostly a highly
impressive group: courageous and professional, articulate and
thoughtful, and genuinely believing in the complex task of fight-
ing extremists while helping an impoverished society.
Yet embedding is a double-edged sword. Propaganda is al-
ways central to the tactics of any army, and the Canadian mil-
itary certainly tries to exploit the media.
It's difficult for an embedded journalist to penetrate the wall
of secrecy that surrounds the military coalition. We still do not
know, for example, which troops' ordered the air strikes that
killed at least 17 civilians in a village near Kandahar last week -
we do not even know the nationality of those troops. So there is
no accountability for the killing of those villagers. lOB
Certainly, the Canadians could claim that without Canadian warplanes in
Afghanistan, Canadians could not have bombed the villa~ers.But, York makes
a subtle distinction in his reporting of that incident in which civilians were
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accidentally killed. He says we still do not know which troops "ordered" the
air strikes, and then Canadians do have the power to call in close air support
from American or French warplanes. As for the restrictions imposed by the
embedding agreement, a partial solution which the Globe employs is having
its reporters in Kandahar make a habit of getting into the local communities
in search of a more balanced perspective.
By the late summer and fall of 2006, senior federal officials became
alarmed about the mostly negative news coming out of Afghanistan, particu-
larly in light of fifteen Canadian soldiers who had been killed in just seven
weeks. E-mail files obtained by the Globe and Mail from that period revealed
that the Canadian public affairs officers in Afghanistan began aggressively
selling or "pushing" development and reconstruction stories to journalists
embedded with the Forces in Afghanistan. It showed the mili~ary public af-
fairs officers successfully changed the direction of the news coverage. The
Globe wrote:
"Obviously, the major concern at [atPCO] is whether we are
pushing development and [Foreign Affairs Canada] issues with
embeds," Maj. (Norbert) Cyr told his military colleagues.
The Canadian Forces, in an e-mail reply to the Privy Council
Office, rejected the notion that it wasn't doing enough to focus
on development work conducted by other departments across
government.
"This cannot be further from the truth.... The daily effort in
theatre and domestically is to demonstrate the overall contribu-
tion of Canada," wrote Sue Daly, a public affairs manager.
"There is an appetite to have more stories to pitch and [we]
would be happy to facilitate this if there is anything you are look-
ing at profiling."
In the same e-mail, the military provided the Privy Council
Office with a list of upcoming coverage plans among the embed-
ded media, including the Canadian Press and Journal de Quebec,
as well as the location of various journalists accompanying sol-
diers in Afghanistan.
"I think you will see from the movements of the embeds
below and the coming plans for interviews that the [public affairs
officers] have been quite successful in their efforts to get the em-
beds to focus their attention elsewhere than the military kinetic
[combat] operations," Ms. Daly wrote.109
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The embedding agreement is but one way that the military controls the
news media in Afghanistan. There is a second element that, again, speaks
volumes about the Canadian Forces - from the generals to the privates. They
systematically train for reporters' presence in a way that the reporters do
not train to cover the military. That control begins nearly half a world away
at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) at Camp Wainwright,
Alberta, about 208 kilometres southeast of Edmonton. Every soldier who de-
ploys to Afghanistan trains at the high-tech CMTC first.
At the CMTC, the soldiers encounter ethnic Afghan actors hired to
play the role of real Afghans in theatre, living and working in very realis-
tic mocked up villages, mosques, and markets. Soldiers who have returned
from Afghanistan help with the details, which make the training second to'
none. The intent is to develop soldiers' expertise in dealing with the complex
Afghan culture and to working through interpreters. Beginning in April
2006, a new element was added to the training; a media cell. The cell was the
idea of public affairs officer Captain Tom St. Denis, a former Royal Australian
Engineer who served in Vietnam. St. Denis is a former print and magazine
journalist who worked in Zimbabwe, Hong Kong, and Sri Lanka before join-
ing the Canadian Forces in 1990.110
Initially, Canadian commanders wanted reservists to play the role, but
St. Denis convinced them that civilian journalists think differently than
soldiers. His arguments won the day and the Forces hired eight journalism
students for each training serial to play the role of journalists the soldiers
could encounter in Afghanistan. Essentially, the media cell is a closed-circuit
television facility. The students are broken into four teams of two. Two oper-
ate the facility called the Canadian News Centre, where the students' work is
shaped into daily newscasts by someone like Brian Kosul, a former Manitoba
newspaper editor and CBC television and radio journalist who joined the
Canadian Forces in 1978 as a public affairs officer until retirement in 1993. Two
students play the role of journalists with the International News Network
(INN) - the mock equivalent of CNN who are unembedded. Two others play
the role of local Afghan journalists with the Local Television Network (LTN),
while the remaining two play the role of embedded Canadians.
During a typical exercise, the commander knows what scenario he wants
his soldiers to train to, such as the reconnaissance of a market. Unknown to
the soldiers, they are being set up to encounter an improvised explosive de-
vice (lED), which is detonated. The soldiers must deal, not only with the dead
and wounded, but also with news reporters who show up unannounced.
Such unscripted scenarios teach the soldiers how to deal with journalists
seeking explanations for events they have witnessed independently and, in
the case of the INN and LTN journalists, who may not be sympathetic to the
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Canadians at all. Koshul explained how the training works at the tactical
level.
If the (Canadian) army says it was a successful operation, the
Afghan looks around; his mother has been shot and his house
burned down, from his perspective, it's not successful at all. The
Canadians (embedded journalists) give the opportunity to state
their (Canadian) case more than that the International News
Network. The whole purpose is to train the Canadian troops.
They have to be careful with the fact there is media and you do
not speak above your pay grade. If they (the media) ask how an
operation was planned, Joe soldier doesn't know. He (the journal-
ist) has to go see the major. If the media ask a policy question,
they say: 'Talk to the politicians.'11J
Meanwhile Captain St. Denis explained how the media cell training works at
the higher strategic level:
The first lesson is to not let the local media seize the entire news
agenda. 'If this is the coverage we're getting, we should do some-
thing about it. We can't let the bad guys get all the air time.' We
can ramp up full-blown news conferences. We can exercise com-
manders in news conferences, for example, in handing detainees
over to local authorities. We manipulate it (the news conference)
to give them (commanders) experience at doing it. We tape it and
we provide feedback. Here's your mannerisms; you ramble; use
short sentences; do not use so much jargon.ll2
In February, 2007, the fruits of Captain (N) Chris Henderson's considerable
work in the Summer 2006 Canadian Military Journal article on the media em-
bedding program, and the detail which emerged in the Toronto Star's Mitch
Potter's reporting on the axe attack on Captain Trevor Greene, paid off. The
Embedding Agreement was amended so that journalists would no longer
be allowed to report the identities of soldiers who killed enemy combatants
in the manner that Potter had identified Captain Schaumhn and Private
McFadden, who shot Greene's assailant. Specifically, the clause reads:
Embedded journalists will not report the 'identity, or specialist
trades of CF personnel who kill or injure anti-coalition militants
without the prior approval of the Task Force Commander....113
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No one should doubt the efficacy of the studied and scholarly approach of
the Canadian Forces toward managing the Canadian news media. There is
simply no equivalent in the journalism industry.
Graham Thomson, the Edmonton Journal's provincial political affairs col-
umnist, spent six weeks embedded with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
in the spring of 2007. Beyond the new embedding agreement (the changes to
which he would have been totally unaware), he said the military's manage-
ment of him during his time living and travelling with the troops was not
overt; he was never once censored, but the pressure to conform to reporting
acceptable to commanders and rank and file soldiers was there nonetheless.
If he pushed, the military could push back with one of the hammers it held
over the reporters: they could be unembedded and sent home. Thomson
wrote that this was most apparent in his first news conference with the sen-
ior Canadian commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier General Tim Grant:
In my first news conference with Brig.-Gen. Grant, he made a
point of saying in front of his staff and other reporters that he
had just read my last article. "And I did not like it,'~ he said.
It seems he did not appreciate how I had compared Canada's
more battle-oriented mission in Afghanistan to that of the
Australians' reconstruction policies. Normally, I do not mind
criticism of my work and in fact have come to expect it, but these
were not normal circumstances. I was a captive audience living
under the thumb of the military and had just been called out by
the man who had the power to have me disembedded.
Nothing came of it, and a few days later Grant invited me
along on a tour of the forward operating bases. But I couldn't help
but feel he had just fired a warning shot across my bow.
I do not think I held back as a result. When a soldier was killed
in an accidental shooting, I pushed as hard as anybody to find
out what happened. .
The military, naturally, pq.shed back. Embedded journalists
on base thought it unfair that we weren't allowed to report on the
rules governing the use of weapons at KAFFor reasons of oper-
ational security, the military did not want the enemy to know
that even though all soldiers carried weapons at all times on base,
the weapons aren't always loaded.
Only after we complained that reporters back in Canada were
freely explaining the rules in their stories did the military relent
.and allow embedded journalists to report that troops at KAF
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did not walk around with loaded weapons all the time, informa-
tion that probably eased people's minds back home when they
learned KAF wasn't a ticking time bomb where weapons were
ready to go off whenever somebody tripped coming out of the
mess tent.1I4
Thomson wrote that a greater fear than being unembedded, however, was
of writing or saying something that might get a soldier injured or killed.
Journalists knew they were dependent on the rank-and-file soldiers they
travelled with and whose job it was to make sure they remained alive while
embedded with them. Still, as much as the journalists and soldiers learned to
live together, there was friction at times. Thomson experienced that friction
when Captain Kevin Megeney was accidently shot and killed on March 6,
2007. When journalists approached soldiers who knew him for details, the
soldiers complained to their officers. Almost instantly, officials were at the
media tent telling the reporters to leave the soldiers alone. It was implied
that if they did not, they would be less welcome on future patrols outside
the wire. Eventually, a compromise was reached when some soldiers agreed
to talk about Corporal Megeney as long as they were not pressed for details
about the accident. Thomson wrote:
It's not the ideal situation for reporters used to much greater free-
doms at home. It is not the ideal situation for the military, either,
I suppose.
In some ways the embedding program is a testament to the
Canadian military's confidence in the professionalism of its sol-
diers and the value of its mission in Afghanistan. The embed-
ding program satisfies, to a large extent, the needs of both sides.
Reporters get to show Canadian's what is going on in Canada's
first war since Korea. The military hopes the soldiers' stories will
help win public support back home even when soldiers die in the
line of duty.lls
Thomson can be forgiven for not knowing about the Kosovo Air War in 1999
because, thanks to Canada's military commanders, no one knows much
about Canada's role in that war. Still, Thomson is certain about one thing: it is
only a matter of time before an embedded journalist is killed in Afghanistan.
He says that not out of bravado but as a matter of fact. "Afghanistan is a dan-
gerous place and every Canadian there, soldier or civilian, is playing Russian
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roulette - and pulling the trigger whenever they climb on board a convoy to
head outside the wire."116
In June 200~ the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute published
a lengthy paper by Sharon Hobson, the Canadian correspondent for Jane's
Defence Weekly, which expressed her opinion that the Canadian Forces and
the news media rely too heavily on the embedding program as a means to
tell Canadians about the mission in Afghanistan. For example, quoting un-
identified journalists she had interviewed, Hobson says the Canadian Forces
plays favourites among journalists who accompany them on their missions.
It was not only a question of personality, but whether the military liked their
previous work, or not. She wrote:
Reporters who did go out with the troops were gambling that
there would be an interesting story to tell during the course of
the mission. But whether or not a reporter would be invited to go
on a particular mission depended not only on available space but
also on military spin and, it was strongly suspected, on personal
acceptability.
The military has its own public relations agenda and attempts
to steer the media to particular stories. In the fall of 2006, word
came down that the government wanted more reconstruction
and development stories. "We've been invited on countless vil-
lage medical outreach visits, ribbon-cutting ceremonies, and
similar events," said one reporter.
There are also attempts to block a reporter from a particular
story "in which the military will promise to push a journalist
out to the front lines and instead sideline the reporter in a unit
that is holding a blocking position, or running a checkpoint in a
safe area, or firing artillery from a distance." While the reporter
concedes that such actions could be the result of happenstance,
flit happens so often that I suspect it's the result of the military
bureaucracy's natural inclination to choose the safest option."
Another reporter who crossed swords with the military very
early on in his six-week embedding assignment by filing a story
the military disputed was not given any further opportunities
to accompany troops outside the wire. He had not breached the
ground rules, so he could not be thrown off the base, but he was
essentially ostracized. In this instance, the military held all the
cards, and there was no avenue of appeal. lI7
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The other problem that she identified was that the journalists' editors and
news directors were increasingly reluctant to commit them to missions
"outside the wire," accompanying troops on operations that took them away
from Kandahar Air Field for long periods of time. The reason for that attitude
was that if a soldier was killed elsewhere, the journalist would not be able
to cover the ramp ceremony. The airfield is the central hub through which
all information flows and public affairs officers soon realized that the repor-
ters' reluctance to go outside the wire was not their fault, but rather that of
the editors and news directors back in Canada, the real gatekeepers of what
Canadians could or could not know. As CBC reporter Chris Brown told her,
he did not accompany the troops on operations:
... in part, because the places they were going to (forward operat-
ing bases mostly), simply had a lot of routine stuff going on that
my desk wasn't that interested in. It is still very dangerous to go
out with the military, and my feeling is that unless the desk wants
a story, I'm not going to put myself and my cameraman at risk for
a story they mayor may not run. It has to be worthwhile. 1I8
One critical issue that Hobson also touched upon in an interview with the
National Post's Chris Wattie, although they do not quite put it this way, is
that there is an enduring belief among journalists that virtually any good
reporter can cover any story. The thinking is that reporters do not have to
have cancer to write a story about cancer. They do not have to be lawyers
to cover courts. They do not have to be political scientists to cover politics.
In fact} many journalists are rotated out of a beat after several years over for
concerns that they may become too familiar with the subject material, too
close to the people involved} and may lose their objectivity. The same think-
ing applies to journalists covering the Canadian Forces. Of the thousands
employed across Canada, there are perhaps a dozen} at most, who specialize
in covering the Canadian Forces. Still, more than three hundred Canadian
journalists have been rotated through the embedding program for four or
five weeks each since its inception. The problems they face are predictable.
Most reporters show up in theatre having to learn about the complexities of
the Canadian Forces, let alone Afghanistan, from scratch. The learning curve
is steep. Wattie, who has been to Afghanistan several times} observed:
"generally, news outlets are not sending their most experienced
military reporters to cover this because it's an on-going} long}
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drawn-out [war], and they're rotating people in and out" - often
young, inexperienced people who do not recognize the import-
ance of getting out into the field and gaining the trust of the
troops. 119
A number of other issues arise with that practice. While the journalists re-
turn to Canada much wiser for their experience, in many cases, there is no
follow-on work covering the military. The journalists go back to covering
the courts and politics and, hence, any opportunity to build up a solid body
of knowledge about the Canadian Forces and Afghanistan. is lost. There is
no collective memory. Most journalists who rotate through Afghanistan are
like cats. When one leaves, the next one shows up no wiser at all for the first
one being there. For a knowledge-based industry, that development is prob-
. lematic. Most Canadian journalists who embed with the Canadian Forces
in Afghanistan are simply no match for the highly trained and experienced
military public affairs officers assigned to manage them and who have seen
dozens upon dozens of reporters, dozens upon dozens just like them, the
soldiers on the ground who have been trained how to deal with them, or
their commanders, who have also been highly coached in dealing with the
news media. Add to that dynamic the imperatives of "operational security"
within the embedding agreements and many journalists feel completely
hamstrung. In lucid moments, they know there is nothing they can do about
it. Richard Latendress experienced that himself and wrote about it in the
Calgary Sun in September, 2007:
Almost daily a new batch of young reporters shows up, bright
eyed and bushy tailed, looking for the scoops.
They find out soon enough that it is definitely a dangerous
assignment, but it is one that is heavily supervised. Being embed-
ded with the Canadian army gives a reporter a front-row seat on
the action, and daily contact with the soldiers themselves.
But, a reporter signs away part of his journalistic soul when he
signs his military papers. The list of rules, restrictions and other
obstacles is as long as the mission itself.
We're not allowed to say exactly where we are, how many
people we're with, or what equipment we have with us. Do not
even think about taking pictures inside of a combat vehicle. Do
not describe how a weapon works. Do not show an antenna on a
hilltop where Canadian soldiers are stationed.
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Although 200 Afghans go by a given command post every day
here on the ground, we can't show that command post in Canada
- it might be helpful to the enemy.
Do not divulge where soldiers keep their water bottles or the
food rations back at the base. Bite your lip if you want to describe
what the Canadians know about the enemy and its military cap-
acity. The list goes on.
The ma,in goal in stifling journalists is to protect our troops; do
not compromise a current or future mission.
The military thinks we do. The Taliban and their henchmen
are everywhere, all over the world, the Canadian military tells
us repeatedly. They're watching our reports, they're reading out
articles, and they're passing our word on to the big cheese, the
head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar.
If the pitfalls of being embedded are annoying, the alternative
is even deadlier.
You'd need a lot more than guts to drive along the roads here
in your own vehicle, looking for a news story - you'd have to be
rash and foolhardy. After all, the dangers threatening our sol-
diers threaten every outsider.
A heap of scrap metal paints a clear picture. It was an Afghan
military vehicle before it met up with im improvised explosive
device. I feel a lot closer travelling in a Canadian tank, thanks.
It's just a regular work day here. No one escapes the relentless
sound of machine guns, rocket fire and grenade launchers.
Nor do they escape the risk of kidnapping, the latest tactic in
the arsenal of the Taliban and other extremists.
With these working conditions, my choice as a reporter is
clear. Despite its drawbacks, there is no wise alternative to being
embedded with our soldiers.12o
The threat to life and limb faced by the journalists, predicted by the Edmonton
Journal's Graham Thompson, was evidenced with the August 22, 2007, ex-
plosion of a roadside bomb that killed two Valcartier-based soldiers, Master
Corporal Christian Duchesne and Master Warrant Officer Mario Mercier,
who had been with Royal 22nd Regiment since July 15. Quite predictably,
French Canadian journalists flocked to Afghanistan to embed with the
soldiers from their home province when they deployed. Among them were
Radio-Canada cameraman Charles Dubois and Patrice Roy, a Radio-Canada
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reporter. They were in the same armoured personnel carrier as Duchesne
and Mercier when the bomb blast tore the vehicle apart. Dubois lost aleg
below the knee while Roy suffered severe nervous shock. It was the first time
a journalist embedded with the Forces in Afghanistan had been seriously
injured. Incredibly, Roy later said that he did not understand the risks of go-
ing to Afghanistan.
"If we'd known the operation was going to be so dangerous, we
wouldn't have gone," Roy, the network's Ottawa bureau chief,
said after the attack, which seriously injured his cameraman,
Charles Dubois, whose leg was later amputated below the knee.
"What I've been asking myself is, are the reports we want to
make to explain the war worth the risks that we take and that we
make our cameramen take? And I do not have an answer," Roy.
said in a televised interview.121
From a strategic perspective, the high-profile Roy's opinions were all bad
news in terms of public opinion in Quebec, not only in terms of support
for the war, but from a societal perspective. A CROP poll of 601 Quebecers
taken before the Duschene and Mercier casualties indicated that more than
two-thirds - some 68 per cent - were opposed to sending Quebec troops
to Afghanistan. That was up from' an earlier 57 per cent.122 After Dubois's
leg amputation, Info 690, one of Montreal's most popular AM radio stations,
asked its audience in an obviously unscientific poll: "Should we continue to
send journalists to Afghanistan?" At the end of the day, 60 per cent said no.123
That raises the troubling question that, if the war against terrorism were
going Well in Afghanistan, how would Quebe~ersknow? How would they
know if it was not going well in Afghanistan? Should they rely on military
or government estimates of the war's progress? It is cynical to say, but Roy's
opinions about journalists' roles are more reminiscent of the First World War's
Max Aitken, than that of the Second World War's Ross Munro - as imperfect
as his reports were - or of the Korean War's Bill Boss. The CBC's Roy did not
understand the threats faced by journalists the way the Edmonton Journal's
Thompson did. Regardless, the Canadian Forces acted swiftly, not only in its
interests, but in the embeds' interests, as·well. Just five days later, journalists
embedded with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan were required to wear
identity dog tags just like the soldiers. It was explained:
43
CENSORSHIP
The Canadian military says the name tags will help make identi-
fication easier if there are any fatalities among journalists while
they are out with soldiers.
. The tags "make it possible to put a name on a warm or cold
body without having to check the wallet," said Capt. Sylvain
Chalifour, a Canadian Forces spokesman.
Also, if journalists want to travel with the troops in the war-
torn country, they will have to take a first-aid course and attend
information sessions to make sure they understand the risks of
what they are doing. 124
Clearly, after taking those steps, journalists, after August 2007, could be left
with little doubt about the risks they were taking. But, the Canadian Forces
were also' being proactive in other ways. One of the most critical was by re-
defining and honing its definition of "operational security" when fighting
against insurgents. This change would have profound effects not only on
the military's role in a democracy but also on the role of the news media in a
democracy. It is imperative that the evolving nature of "operational security"
as envisioned in Defence and Administrative Orders 2008 (DAOD 2008) and
the understanding of operational security in February 14, 2008, be explained.
DAOD 2008 is the Canadian Forces' public affairs guidelines for oper-
ations effective January 30,1998, which required the Forces to integrate public
affairs policy and direction into "all aspects of military doctrine, as appropri-
ate, to ensure that PA is fully integrated into CF military planning, decision
making, standard operating procedures, and operations."125 Included in
DAOD 2008, were guidelines in the event of escalating military tension or
war that required the deputy chief of defence staff to fully integrate public
affairs into military doctrine and the director general of public affairs to draft
and implement a national public affairs plan.126
The guidelines recognized that the key priority of any Forces operation
is to achieve its mission, but, at the same time, it accepted there would be.
heightened media and public interest. The challenge for the Forces was to
inform Canadians of the national and operation dimensions "in a manner
that is accurate, complete, timely and respectful of the principles of open-
ness, transparency and operational security."127
It is also clear, however, that the requirements for openness and trans-
parency and operational security could conflict. By "operational security,"
DAOD 2008 meant "the principle of safeguarding the integrity of a military
operation or activity, and/or the safety of the CF members and other person-
nel involved in the military operation or activity."128
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On February 18, 2008, at a technical briefing at· National Defence
Headquarters, Brigadier General Peter Atkinson, Director General
Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, updated participants on Canada's activities
in Afghanistan. He elaborated on the new concept of "operational security"
or "opsec" in military jargon. It is imperative to examine Atkinson's inter-
pretation because he puts it in journalistic terms, as well as the Internet, with
profound consequences not only for journalists, but for Canadians whom
they inform.
Simply put, opsec is keeping the good guys' secrets from the
bad guys. We firmly believe that Canadians have the right to
know about our operations in Afghanistan. We also understand
the importance of independent reporting and analysis of the
government of Canada in this complex environment. Your ap-
petite for information serves positive and lawful objectives of our
Canadian democracy. Opsec allows the safeguarding of some
information that has an operational impact on our mission while
permitting Canadians to know as much as possible about their
soldiers and members of the whole government team.
I described recently, at the Standing Committee on National
Defence, the' mosaic effect as it relates to operational security.
This can be portrayed in terms of journalism. A news story is not
complete until all facets of it are discovered and reported. It leads
off with a tip to a potential story. The journalist then pursues a
lead to put a comprehensive story together that portrays the re-
sult of all their sources.
In essence, the mosaic effect is just that. Simply, the smallest
piece of information may be invaluable in the hands of personnel
employed in the counter intelligence world, given the fact that
they have access to a much broader spectrum of information. In
the hands of a journalist, unrelated pieces of information can be
turned into an excellent story.
The same is true for sensitive information, which may not in
and of themselves be sensitive but formed together they create a
comprehensive picture of significant use to our adversaries. To
provide some context, a curre!lt example from our ongoing mis-
sion in Afghanistan may help.
The CDS described this about a week ago, when he was in
front of the media. The Taliban put a huge amount of effort to
find out where their people have gone when they disappear.
45
CENSORSHIP
They do not know whether they've been killed, they do not know
whether they've been detained. They do not know when they
show back up whether they've simply been released because of
a lack of evidence or if they show back up it's because they've
turned and are reporting to us.
They do not know whether they're giving us information
when they've been detained and they put a huge effort into find-
ing this out, to try and determine those things. At the same time,
they find it very difficult to peel back what happened and look at
our tactics and, therefore, make us more predictable to them, and
therefore increase the risk to our soldiers on the ground. This is
the operational security aspect of it. It causes the Taliban great
difficulty. And we're comfortable with that because we've got a
responsibility to our soldiers and to their families.
So, from a whole of government perspective, the overarching
opsec principle is a collective responsibility for all of us both mil-
itary, civilian, our families and I would say even the media. In a
recent case, a media outlet understood opsec and made the right
choice. The outlet asked for specific details on a mission's rules of·
engagement and about our contingency plan.
The Canadian Forces discussed the request with the specific
media outlet, explaining that providing the information to that
level of detail would have placed our troops at fisk. The outlet
agreed and they did not pursue the request and that mission
went off without a hitch.
Now, the internet specifically. Social networking' sites like
Facebook. It's an invaluable tool for our soldiers to stay in contact
with their families and friends. To the same degree, the internet is
a fertile environment for exploitation. Sharing sites like YouTube
and the collaborative Wiki type sites make exploitation very easy.
A practical example from the internet is a useful demonstration
of what I'm talking about.
A search of the text "Canadian deaths in Afghanistan" re-
sulted in approximately 200,000 hits. They range from accredited
media agencies to Wikipedia to personal blogs. The mosaic effect
is perfectly illustrated by the Wikipedia site. Due to its collabora~
tive content contribution anybody can add to the content, provid-
ing a compilation of details on a specific instance. For example,
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like the description of a casualty with photos, locations and news
articles contributed by several sources.
The insurgents could use this information to determine their
success or their lack of it, of their actions, and determine better
ways for them to attack us. Because of the speed and capacity of
today's technology, we are virtually providing the enemy with
his battle damage assessment instantly.
To close, here is an excerpt from an AI-Qaeda training manual
with respect to their use of information sources. They identify
that an organization must gather as much information as pos-
sible about the enemy, in other words about us. Information in
their words has two sources. Public sources. Using this public
source openly and without reporting to illegal means it is pos-
sible to gather at least 80% of the information about the enemy.
Now secret sources. It is possible through these secret and
dangerous methods to obtain 20% of the information that is
considered secret. So we need to make their collection efforts as
difficult as possible, by denying them 80% of the solution. This
will make it difficult for groups like AI-Qaeda to plan their oper-
ations.129
Brigadier General Atkinson clearly believes with almost messianic zeal in
the imperatives of operational security and his thoughts would be acceptable
if he lived in a totalitarian state. Canada is a democracy. It is not the place
of a Canadian military man, regardless of his sincerity, to suggest that the
publicly available information about Canada's prosecution of the war against
terrorism in Afghanistan should be denied to Canadians in the news and to
AI-Qaeda as a by-product. The public's right to know is not worth the life of
even one Canadian soldier, but at the same time, one of the values that a mil-
itary man living in a democracy ought to defend - not obliterate in the name
of operational security - is the democratic role of the news media, even when
it comes to Afghanistan. Yet, there are many within the Canadian Forces
who see the news media as enemy, as it will be seen presently.
Public Affairs Officers
Whether stationed at home or abroad, military public affairs officers play
a contested role in facilitating, managing, shaping, or censoring the news
and the journalists who produce it, depending on the perspective. Major Jay
Janzen, who wrote the Canadian Army Journal on the initial success of the
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embedding program after his experience in Afghanistan, is among them.
That article, he explained, was written for mid-level commanders to demon-
strate that the news media can be managed well and relations between the
military and the media can go easier if it is done right. Janzen was assigned
the public affairs officer in Kabul during the first major rotation of Canadian
battle group from August 2003, to February 2004. When he first arrived in
Afghanistan, there were no embedded ground rules in place because they
had not yet been approved in Ottawa. That immediately placed him in con-
flict with Canadian journalists at the gates of Camp Julien, the Canadian
compound. Among the":l was the National Post's Chris Wattie, who lodged a
formal complaint. For about a week to ten days, Janzen said there was noth-
ing he could do to accommodate them. Finally, the journalists were allowed
in and the deputy commander of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) took a personal interest in accommodating them as much as he could,
Janzen said.
At that time, we were still a post-Somalia culture and there were
folks in the senior NCO corps who would consider the media
almost to be enemy i.e. the sergeants and the warrant officers.
When the senior warrant officers aren't media friendly, it can
make an impact on the young guys. For the media to come in
and live with us was tough post-Somalia. But, General Leslie
realized we weren't going to succeed in the mission and with the
Canadian public without the media. The media was to be wel-
comed and not excluded, but included. That was a shift in the
way of thinking for some people. So, when the troops come into
the mess hall and see the commanding officer sitting with two or
three journalists and having a conversation, that says something
to the troops.l30
Clearly, Brigadier General Atkinson is in the camp that views the news
media as enemy. Major Janzen, meanwhile, explained that perhaps a dozen
Canadian journalists, at most, specialize in covering the Canadian Forces.
It is possible, he said, to count the number of journalists who have covered
the Canadian Forces for twenty years or more on one hand. Janzen said it
was the more experienced journalists who tended to be the first to arrive in
Afghanistan. Among them were the Canadian Press's Steven Thorne and Les
Perreaux, the National Post's Matthew Fisher, and CBC television reporters
Steve Chow and Rob Gordon. Janzen said he saw Thorne take a number of
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young journalists from the Sun newspaper chain under his wing and show
them the ropes.
But, when the vets rotated out, we had people there who did not
know the rank structure, who did not know the difference be-
tween a colonel and a corporal. We had people with no money
looking for an ATM machine. A lot did not show up with Flak
jackets and helmets. When we had several inches of snow in
December and temperatures below zero, we had people show up
with no sleeping bags. We had freelancers show up from small
community newspapers, who in some cases did not have proper
clearance from Ottawa. They just showed up. Of course we took
them in, but now we're more strict [sic]. They have to get the
proper clearance before they get on the plane.n1
One Canadian Forces public affairs officer admitted to this author off the rec-
ord that it was preferred that the media embed with the Forces in Afghanistan
for six weeks for a very specific reason. Most show up not knowing a lot
about either the military or Afghanistan and it takes them about six week$
to get up to speed. During that time, they take direction from public affairs
officers readily, but after six weeks, they develop their own ideas about what
they want to cover, which is not always in the Forces' best interest.132 Janzen,
however, disagreed. He explained that, over time, the military saw that over
the course of non-stop work in Afghanistan, seven days a week, many jour-
nalists become tired and burn out.
It's for a good reason we do the six weeks. There is a lot of stress
and they do not necessarily have the training and unit support
of the Forces. Six weeks with us is an intense indoctrination.
They're eating with us; living with us; getting shot at. It's like be-
ing immersed in a new culture. In many cases, they're a lone wolf
out there. Their families do not have military family resource
centres backing them up. I know people from small papers who
went there who would never come back and would never cover
defence again. And the news media is changing, going to smaller
staffs and downsizing. The media guys who have been there be-
fore, they're confident and they'll tell you what they want and
you take them and put them in with units. But when you get
someone who is green and from the smaller papers, quite often
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they're overwhelmed. You've got to hold their hand. They get lost
in camp; they can't find the showers and the mess hall. They're
overwhelmed by the danger and the thousands of troops. They're
just overwhelmed.133
Time and again; Janzen said, the public affairs officers saw new inexperi-
enced journalists repeat the same pattern. Many would be reluctant to go on
patrols in the dangerous hinterlands outside the main camp.
After a few days, they think they can't trust the public affairs of-
ficers. They wouldn't go on patrol, but at the same time they had
something to prove. There are rules about soldiers not fraterniz-
ing in theatre, even husbands and wives. But there was specula-
tion about who might be, so they would write these trivial stories
about sex in the camp. It seemed like once they got that out of
their system they would relax and they would say (to the publiC
affairs officers): 'What would you like to do now?' I always get the
sense that some journalists are always looking for the big scoop.
When I say that: the next Somalia scandal. It wasn't what we were
doing on the ground; it was what we were doing wrong. Look at
the detainee file. On that whole file there's many people working
to try to find some wrong doing. We saw the British soldiers beat-
ing children in Iraq in 2005 and the Americans in Abu Ghraib
(prison). The damage that causes is almost irreparable. But one
of the reasons we've got the support of the Canadian people,
whether it's support for the mission or the troops, one of the big
reasons the Canadian Forces enjoy the public support is because
the troops on the ground are conducting themselves in anexem-
plary manner.l34
Major Janzen acknowledges in the Canadian Army Journal article that the
embedding program enables the military to influence news media coverage,
but he says there is a big difference between influencing the news media
coverage and "spinning" the journalists and their news so that the Canadian
Forces are depicted in an positive light.
It's a question of, we have the information, you decide what to
do with it. We do not make a concerted effort to distort or shape
or influence public opinion. It's not cloak and dagger stuff. We're
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trained to set the conditions for humanitarian aid and the rule of
law [in Afghanistan] so little girls go to school. The bottom line is
we do good work.135
This was precisely the point that a Globe and Mail article made on June 4,
2008, that that direction had been given and military public affairs officers
promoted stories about the Forces enabling development work. Regardless,
Janzen also addressed the issue of operational security and his approach to
it. He acknowledged that the Forces do withhold information but he said 95
per cent of the time it is for reasons of operational security and that, if it were
released, someone could get killed. The information could also be classified.
But, on the other hand, he said, there was a strong contingent of soldiers
in Afghanistan who did not want to be identified in news reports, fearing
their families might be targeted in Canada. (This was precisely the erroneous
reasons airmen were not identified during the 1999 Kosovo Air War.) Janzen
said:
They wanted to use nicknames and pseudonyms. The first ques-
tion I raised was: is this a credible threat? I went to the CF intel-
ligence branch to up the chain of command at NDHQ. That was
July 2003. The answer was: No. There is no credible threat. There
were occupations like snipers we had classified, but soldiers are
encouraged to use their full names. It lends credibility to the mis-
sion, but we do not force any soldier to give hIS name or do inter-
views with the media, just do not say you're not allowed to. If
they are asked how many insurgents you have killed, the answer
is taking lives is an unfortunate part of what we do, but we do not
want to set people up for retribution.136
At Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Captain Joanne Blais was
the public affairs officer for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
in December 2007. She had worked in public affairs at bC?th Kandahar Air
Field from October to November 2006 and at the KRP in December 2006 and
then returned to KAF and worked with the battle group, replacing its public
affairs officer. She says she sees many similar behaviours in journalists who
arrive in Afghanistan for the first time.
I find that when you have a reporter in a harsh environment,
he wants to go back and say he covered a war. They're war
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correspondents in their minds; the faster they get outside
Kandahar Air Field, the better feel they have for how it works.
They have to be out there and sleep with the soldiers and then
they know what they want. They're all hyperactive and they're
afraid they will not deliver. Then, they're a lot more relaxed and
know what they're looking for. They can tell the people at home
they were out there with the soldiers.137
She said that, on many occasions, journalists want stories on non-combat
reconstruction aspects of the provincial development team, but they have
no idea what stories are out there, who to talk to, or even where to start. As a
result, Blais directs them to the Women's Literary Program, a Civil Military
Co-operation (CIMIC) team or the World Food Program.
With the literary program, they have to go with a fixer. So I try to
find them an opportunity and we call the Canadian embedded
journalist. We have an activity for you Friday at 9 a.m. Some re-
porters will not go with a fixer. They're afraid of kidnapping. The
other one I work with is the CIMIC team. I would offer a reporter
the chance to spend a week with the military in a shura [a meet-
ing with village elders]. It's not perfect. I still send them outside
the wire for a week, but when they come back I know what types
of projects they are interested in covering. They also do not have
the contacts here in the city with the World Food Program. So
they come to us and say these are the things I am interested in,
can you help me out?138
Blais acknowledges that there can be both upsides and downsides to offering
journalists opportunities to go outside the wire, because, if they do, their
editors will be furious if a soldier dies and they are not there to cover the
ramp ceremonies. On the one hand, if they go outside the wire, they will
be in the middle of the action. On the other, in the event of fatalities, she
tries to assure them they can be returned in time for the ramp ceremony.
Having said that, there are technical problems why some journalists cannot
remain at the provincial reconstruction team for long. There are no television
facilities at the PRT location on the north side of Kandahar City. Television
reporters must return to the airfield to file their stories while print reporters
can file from almost anywhere by internet or satellite telephone. But, Blais
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also notes a host of other issues that she has observed either when journalists
first arrive or they are about to leave:
I find they're not physically prepared for the challenge. We ask:
"Could they walk three kilometres with a sleeping bag on their
back?" One guy was overweight and he couldn't fit in the back
of a LAV (Light Armoured Vehicle). It's hard to find somebody
physically fit for the challenge. I also do not like to have them at
the end of the six weeks. They're tired and they do not care any-
more. What are we going to do, kick them out? That's when they
get opsec information out. But the same thing happens with the
military. After five and a half months, a lot of accidents happen.
You're tired.l39
The other problem that she discovered accommodating some journalists'
request about aid stories is that it could take four days to get permission from
a Canadian International Development Agency director in Ottawa to write
about a story. For example, it was essential to send Timothea Gibb to work
with her at Camp Nathan Smith because the embedded journalists prefer to
interview people in person.
Gibb is a public diplomacy officer who handles the media relations
and requests relating to CIDA and Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade programs. Of the 250 Canadian journalists who have
been embedded in Afghanistan, she has observed, it is always the same ones
who return more than once: CTV's Steve Chow, Murray Oliver, and Paul
Workman; the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith and Christie Blatchford, and
Canadian Press's Bill Graveland. Graveland, in particular, likes to be where
the action is, she said:
Like one time I sent him out with the OMLET· [Operational
Mentor Liaison Team]. They were shot at. He said it was great; we
got a lot of action. And others will come back and say, if I knew
it was going to be that dangerous, I wouldn't go. My task is to
get the development and reconstruction story out. What I learned
with many of our development programs do not want a military
convoy to come out here. The trick was to send media with fixers
like staff. I look to see who is willing to entertain reporters and
then they come back to get Canadian content. It's tough. A lot of
them work until 2 or 3 a.m. in the morning so they can file their
stories on time with the 9 1/2 hours' time difference. You have to
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manage their stress, as well. It isn't easy. I completely understand.
Our schedule doesn't give them much time to sleep.140
Journalists
At the time of writing, the Canadian Press's Bill Graveland had been to
Afghanistan twice. The first time was from November, 2006, to January
15, 2007, and the second time from October 19 to December 5, 2007. He no-
ticed striking differences between his first and second assignments. He
travelled mostly with the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and
the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), a tank regiment on his first
assignment, but on his second assignment, the French Canadian Royal 22nd
Regiment was in theatre.
The first time there was a lot of media. There was twelve to four-
teen, so there was a lot of competition. The PAFFOs would come
with an opportunity. They would say how would you like to go
with PsyOps (psychological operations) foot patrolling? They'd
be looking for a story on PsyOps and they would generally dis-
guise it with something classified. For example, when I went with
the Psyops guys, it was their first time deploying tanks at Masum
Ghar, near Panjwaii, but they knew they were coming over so
they got me and CTV to cover the story at the same time. It was a
publicity bonus for them and a nice story for us.
They always come to us with something in mind, so you would
get that story to pick up as well as a dozen others just being there.
Back then, there was no restrictions, you could name the forward
operating bases, Masum Ghar, Sperwan Ghar. It was a lot more
relaxed. They might come by to tell you 'this is a little wrong or
the name of the regiment is wrong. They read everything. I must
have interviewed General (Tim) Grant a half a dozen times at
least and Col. Omar Lavoie. They were accessible all the time,
constantly. Generally, if you want to go out constantly, they treat
it differently. I went out 10 or 12 times so generally, if you want
things, they would make it happen.
The second time, in August, there would have been sixteen
or eighteen there. It was packed. They had an extra media tent
to sleep in. At the time, the PAFFO made it clear to me that the
English media were second fiddle to the French media. But there
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ended up being remarkably less media. Perhaps half a dozen
and there were a lot more restrictions. After the Radio Canadian
cameraman lost his leg, most of the Francophone media left after
the first three or four weeks. After that, there were six of us, The
Globe and Mail and the TV pool. November 6 they started doing
the television pool: CTV, CBC and Global. They decided to go to
the pool system because of costS.141
Graveland was at Forward Operating Base (~OB) Wilson on November 17,
2007, when National Defence Minister Peter MacKay arrived and rockets
were fiJ:ed at the base. He said the media were kept at a different part of the
base when the rocket attack happened. After the rocket attack, the media
were censured, for operational security reasons, for identifying FOB Wilson.
Suddenly, he said, it was difficult for any of them to make trips outside the
wire.
Then they started clamping down. In the Arghandab region,
the Taliban tried to take care of a leadership vacuum. The mullah
died of a heart attack. Previously, they would let us go forward.
They had briefings at the base, but they wouldn't let us go for-
ward. I did a story on unmanned aerial vehicles and talked to
the soldiers inside the mission, the captain and the major who
gave us information. They could see the Taliban guys, but they
couldn't get air support in quickly enough. You could see the
Taliban and the RPGs. It looked like they were ten feet away.
They called in air support to blow the shit out of them, but it did
not show up. The soldiers were expressing concern that if we
had a Predator, they'd be dead by now. I purposely didn't name
the soldiers because I thought there might be repercussions. The
next day, I'm called into the head public affairs officer who was
not pleased with the story. They tried to say it was operational
security, but it wasn't. The soldiers thanked me for it saying it
was right on; but I got dressed down for it. I said, they did you a
favour, this machine is a piece of shit. The next time I did a story,
there was a public affairs officer sitting in. I said: "This is new,"




Without a doubt, the most prominent Canadian journalist in Afghanistan
was the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith, who first began travelling there from
Russia in 2005 when he was assigned to the Globe's Moscow bureau,.osten-
sibly from 2005 to 2007. At the time, he was told Afghanistan would be 20 per
cent of his job. He wrote a proposal arguing it should be 100 per cent of his
job. As a result, Smith was assigned permanently to Afghanistan in the sum-
mer of 2006 until spring 2009. With nineteen weeks a year off by agreement,
he did not get paid any extra for one of the most dangerous assignments on
earth. For example, in November 2006, he tried an experiment to report on
Afghanistan independently from the Canadian Forces.
I rented an office compound on the south side of Kandahar. Then
in February 2007, three gun men raided the place. Two had AK-
47s and one had a pistol. No one was there but my cook who got
beat up. There was a lap top computer and a couple of disks.
They searched the. place pretty thoroughly from top to bottom.
Military intelligence told me it was directed at me; it was the fact
they didn't steal the computer. It could have been two things,
intimidation and kidnapping. We talked to the Taliban later and
they said it wasn't them. It was a short-lived experiment. It was
lovely to have a meeting place to invite people for tea. We did
a story on the economy and unemployment. There was a street
where guys were hanging out looking for jobs. Instead of hang-
ing out on the street, we invited them in for tea. You don't just
walk up to somebody on the street in Kandahar.143
Smith says he has seen dramatic changes in the way the military treats and
manages the news media over the years as a result of political direction from
Ottawa.
There has been a massive shift in military PR strategy. In 2005, it
was all access; all you can eat. When I first arrived in Kandahar,
they gave me an intelligence briefing on what was going on.
In 2006, the media arrived en masse and the media were claw-
ing each other's eyes out to go on a convoy. There was a lot of
mistrust. We weren't sure how the game was being played. The
military learned in 2006 that if they gave us lots and lots of ac-
cess, we would tell their story, rather than someone else's. Before
Operation Medusa, the Royal Canadian Regiment got it. They
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pushed us over to the front all the time, which was a double edged
sword. We glossed over civilian casualties. We didn't really cover
that because we were out with the troops. That was a PR coup
for the military. Canadians knew what was going on. They saw
the operations. Then the news cycle cooled down in 2007. It was
still all access, you could go on as many patrols as you wanted,
but they started to become concerned about spin. A public affairs
captain started coming out to the field, supervising you.
There was a message from up high that we were getting sloppy
on opsec, using names we used for roads; these bizarre situations.
A top general would describe opening Route Fosters, it runs par-
allel to the Arghandab River and Panjwaii. They thought route
was another name for a road, so we had to redo the clip saying
The Road. It's not security, just a restriction of information. If they
could keep us worried about roads and things then presumably
they could keep us worrying about other things. They told me it
came from Ottawa, the Centre; the Privy Council Office.144
Working in Kandahar, Smith was basically confined to KAF at night. No one
has an independent base outside the wire. He employed two full-time fixers.
One handled the government contacts and the other, who had relatives in the
Taliban, handled tribal and Taliban contacts. As part of Smith's daily routine,
he woke up in an eight-man tent at the Kandahar Air Field. If he wanted to
unembed, he dressed in local Afghan clothes and walked across the stones
that lead to the airfield base's entrance. In 2007, he says, it was safe enough to
walk the local streets at night. He also drove a beat-up Toyota Corolla.
Last winter I was driving 40 kilometres outside of the city. In the
spring, I wouldn't leave the central part of the city. There is a jour-
nalistic credo; do not get killed for colour. If you do cover some
UN agencies, the risk is gettfng targeted. You have to ask if it's
worthwhile. I'm not concerned about getting blown up; I worried
about kidnapping. I try to be back by dusk because it's getting
dangerous out there.
I can go downtown on any given day. I can unembed and get
a taxi. But there is a rule: you have to spend the majority of your
time covering the Canadian military. On more than one occa-
sion, I've been told they can kick me out because I spend a lot of
time .downtown. I said: "A) let me know when I write a story that
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doesn't have to do with Canadians or B) kick me out and let's see
what happens."145
In that regard, Smith says he was under pressure - and often threat - from
both the Afghan government and the Canadian Forces.
If I write a story about the environment minister that he doesn't
like, he might not talk to me again. If we write a story about a
governor that he doesn't like, the Canadian Forces tell us we're
threatened with violence. You have to do a risk assessment for
everything you do. I've been told there are stories I shouldn't
write until I'm permanently ready to leave. I think what we're
doing in Afghanistan is flawed but, if we leave, things will be
worse. My basic thinking is the West has come to Afghanistan
and tried to do too much with too little. All of this is with the
caveat that I'm a reporter and I have to keep an open mind.146
There are two last points that, as a journalist, Smith says he was certain
about. The first point is that he made a wise decision to stop taking lessons
in Pashto, the Iranian language spoken mostly in Afghanistan. He explained:
I was learning it, but I made a conscious decision to stop learning.
I don't want Afghanistan to become my life. It's a tough, tough
place. I know journalists who have made it their life and I think
they're fucking insane. You have to push yourself. I'm going to
be doing this for the next 18 months or two years. Foreigners, in
general, don't understand how dangerous Afghanistan is. Things
have gotten worse but that doesn't mean it's hopeless. People con-
fuse things that are drastically worse and completely hopeless.147
The second thing about which he was absolutely certain is that the war is
Canada's single most important foreign policy issue. In that regard, he says:
It's a failing of the Canadian media that I'm the only guy perma-
nently assigned there. There should be an army of us over there.148
If the Canadian Press's Graveland149 and the Globe and Mail's Smith are anom-
alies in Canadian journalism for their ongoing commitment to covering
Afghanistan, the Calgary Herald's Renata D'Aliesio is far more typical of the
some three hundred who have been embedded with the Canadian Forces
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there. D'Aliesio was the Herald's environmental reporter who, years earlier,
had taken a week-long course in conflict reporting offered for insurance rea-
sons in Vancouver by CanWest, while at the Edmonton ]oumal in 2003. She
recalled:
The first three days it was gunshot wounds and we went through
what you do to get a fixer and how to use a satellit~ phone, but
it wasn't conflict training like you would get from a military or
private firm. Because I had taken the training, my (Herald) editor
asked me if I was willing to go to Afghanistan. CanWest had de-
cided to start staffing Afghanistan on four to six week rotations. I
knew when I went to Afghanistan, to tell the story properly, I had
to leave the wire. I was prepared to do that.lso
D'Aliesio arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Monday September 4, 2006. By
Wednesday, she had flown to Kandahar. She had time for a quick helicop-
ter tour of the area with Canadian Brigadier General David Fraser, head of
NATO's southern Afghanistan operation, and to write one story about a
married couple of soldiers at Kandahar Air Field, to be published on Friday
September 8. She was given notice on Thursday evening at 11 p.m. that,
if she wanted to embed for Operation Medusa, she should be ready for 5
a.m. Operation Medusa was an offensive in southern Afghanistan against
an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Ta1iban fighters and involved some 6,000 NATO
treops from five countries in addition to Afghan forces.lSI She knew that her
competition, the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith and the Canadian Press's Les
Perreaux were already in the field with the troops and she felt duty-bound
to take whatever risks were necessary to report ori the OP Medusa. She ac-
companied General Fraser to a Canadian staging point at Forward Operating
Base Wilson and met up with Captain Ed Stewart of A company with the
Princess Patricia's from Winnipeg. She was told she would be out a day or
two but was out nearly ten days. She recalled:
It was a lot of learning as I went. I'm originally from Toronto
and I think I was thankful that I went camping when I moved to
Alberta. The first couple of days, they were waiting to get orders
to advance. That was good because I didn't understand the mil-
itary structure. I got to know some of the soldiers and that I could
handle the hardship, sleeping in the sand and being up that
many hours. They got to know me. One thing, being a female,
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you had to let go of a lot of your vanity. They wouldn't let me to
go the bathroom, to the bush, alone. I had to ask for an armed
escort. I had let go, but one of the concerns was here was this
extra person they had to worry about. But, I found the explosions
happening around you, it took a couple of days to stop jumping
and sleep through that.
The first night, they wanted me to sleep in the" LAV, but I want-
ed to sleep outside and they let me but, when it got too dangerous,
they made me sleep inside. When they were advancing on foot to
the village, I wanted to go, but they wouldn't let me, so there were
limitations. But, as I spent time with them, as a reporter, I started
realizing it was too risky. When they went into Pashmul, they
wouldn't let me in until it was safe. I briefly had a sense of where I
was on the map. People ask me, did I see bodies? No. I was inside
the LAV when they were fighting, but you have no sense of the
fighting. At that point, they had already suffered initial casual-
ties and their tactics had changed. They decided to get more ag-
gressive. When they got into Pashmul, they were surprised there
were so few Taliban. After a couple of days, I realized I could take
it. At that point, Graeme and Les decided to go back and I was the
only one with A company. They switched me to a company from
Petawawa that was staying outside Pashmul.152
Long gone are the days when Second World War correspondents like Ross
Munro had to wait until he returned to London from the beaches at Dieppe
to file his stories, or two days for Bill Boss's story on Kap'yong to be pub-
lished. After D'Aliesio finished her research and interviews, she plugged
her computer into the soldiers' Light Armoured Vehicle's electrical system.
Aiming her satellite phone into position, she accessed the Internet through
her laptop and filed her stories. As the soldiers watched her go about her
work, they warmed up to her.
They told me it was good for morale to have me with them. They
have a few women, but it's not the same. It was refreshing for
the soldiers to have someone who was not military. It got them
connected to the outside world. I realized how much better it
was to do my job out in the field than on base where people are
scared to talk to you. I know a lot of them were surprised you
were willing to go through it as much as we did. It was kind of
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cool. The soldiers were asking me: "Are you getting paid better to
be here?" and I said: "Nope, I'm getting the same money as writ-
ing aboilt the environment in Calgary." That's when they think
you're crazy.153
D'Aliesio said breaking operational security was never an issue during
Operation Medusa because the soldiers simply would not tell her what they
were going to do next. After Medusa, she spent a week back at Kandahar Air
Field and then opted to go back into the field with a provincial reconstruc-
tion team. She stayed with them in Zhari district where, in earlier fighting,
Canadian Special Forces and the Afghan military had killed some five hun-
dred Taliban at Sperwan Ghar, but the embedding ground rules would not
let her write about the Special Forces. When General Rick Hillier showed up
to address the troops, he did not know D'Aliesio was there and told them
about plans to strengthen the LAVs and went into the details. When he saw
D'Aliesio, he personally told her she could not report that fact for operational
security reasons. She left the details out of her story. At that point, her power
adaptor broke and she ended up dictating stories. At times, there was also
conflict with the rank and file soldiers she met at Kandahar Air Field.
We were on base when a suicide bomber hit A company. They
were on this foot patrol. Four of them died. We were trying to
talk to the soldiers when they returned and we got reamed out
for that. They said you can't talk to anyone for 24 to 48 hours.
Then they realized it was part of our job to talk to soldiers and
they decided they would talk to us. The military has learned to
offer someone up to speak to issues. l54
D'Aliesio says that it was not until she arrived in Dubai after six weeks in
Afghanistan that the enormity of what she had just done started to sink in.
And, as a result of Afghanistan, she said she learned a lot about herself. Her
reflections on that experience echo Janzen's observations that journalists
often do not have the support network that the military does and that, in
many cases, they can feel like lone wolves.
It wasn't until I got to Dubai that I realized the stress I was under.
I realized how little fear I had out there, which was bad because I
started taking risks. I went to Sperwan Ghar in a G-wagon with
Canadian soldiers, military policemen, on a dirt road that was
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known to be packed with explosives. They were scared the whole
time and I realized how scared they were. We made it okay, but I
later realized that was a risk I probably shouldn't have taken, but
soldiers were doing it every day.
You know that something could happen to you; you could get
injured and you could die. I also realized that I'm tougher than I
thought. But you're back in quiet Calgary, there is this feeling, I'm
going to be okay doing stories here. [In Afghanistan] you were
involved in the biggest story in the whole world, but you don't
have anyone here who understands. All those things I was grap-
pling with; if I could go back, I would, now knowing I would
better understand. ISS
Operation Medusa'
For sixteen days in September, 2006, Canadian soldiers participated in one of
its largest sustained ground battles since the Second World War, Operation
Medusa, against 3,000 to 4,000 Taliban fighters.l56 Precise numbers of NATO
soldiers from the participating countries have not been revealed, but it was
generally reported that hundreds of Canadian troops were involved. The
battles took place in the Zhari, Panjwaii, and Pashmul regions that had been
used as Taliban staging grounds for terror attacks and ambushes in and
around Kandahar City, some thirty kilometres to the east. In the preceding
four months, fighting in these regions had claimed the lives of six Canadian
soldiers and left dozens more wounded. In keeping with the news media
dictum "If it bleeds, it leads" news of the pitched battles was guaranteed
front-page coverage when four Canadians were killed on September 3, one
day after the battle started. The operation ended on Sunday, September 17. As
such, Operation Medusa offers a rich case study opportunity to compare and
contrast the coverage of eight select Canadian English-language newspapers
from Vancouver to Halifax of the combat operation and the manifestations of
the media embedding program. Each newspaper's coverage was examined in
its entirety from September 2 through to September 18, the day after combat
operations ceased. These newspapers represent two distributed nationally,
major markets in the west and central Canada, medium markets on the prai-
ries and a minor market newspaper on Canada's east coast. The newspapers'




From September 3 to 18, the Herald ran thirty-nine news stories and
three opinion pieces about Afghanistan. Of them, eighteen originated in
Afghanistan and thirteen were authored by Renata D'Aliesio, the Herald staff
writer in Afghanistan who was embedded with the troops during Operation
Medusa. Her first story appeared on September 9, the result of her arrival in
theatre after the operation began. Given the nature of the insurgent battle,
she never had the opportunity to witness the epic confrontations between
Allies and enemies that Ross Munro and Bill Boss did during the Second
World War and Korea respectively. When there was combat or danger, the
soldiers kept her ensconced inside their Light Armoured Vehicle. However,
D'Aliesio was undoubtedly risking her life following the soldiers on patrol
and taking pictures of them in one of the most heavily mined areas in the
world, where most soldiers do not die in combat but as a result of improvised
explosive devices. Most of her stories were about what the soldiers she was
with found after the battles were over, their thoughts on the conflict, and on
the firefights they had been in. The vast majority of stories in the Herald dur-
ing that period dealt with the political fall-out from four Canadians killed
by rocket propelled grenades on the first day of battle, Sunday, September 3.
It was front-page news and it was followed by a steady stream of news and
comment when the coffins returned to Canada and their funeral services
were held. September 11th, the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Centre in New York, sparked most of the coverage with tributes
paid to the Canadians who had lost their lives in Afghanistan in the fol-
lowing years. The New Democratic Party also held a convention in Quebec
at about the same time, and party leader Jack Layton's call for a pull-out of
Canadian troops from Afghanistan also dominated coverage. Prime Minster
Stephen Harper was quoted in just one 9/11 news story in which he drew
links to it and Canada's role in Afghanistan. D'Aliesio wrapped up her cover-
age of Operation Medusa in interviews on its success with Brigadier General
David Fraser, the Canadian commander of NATO in southern Afghanistan
and Kandahar's Governor Asadullah Khalid.
National Post (Toronto)
The National Post, owned by CanWest, is one of two Canadian daily news-
papers distributed nationally. Over the course of Operation Medusa, it car-
ried nineteen news stories relate~ to Afghanistan. Only five articles origin-
ated in Afghanistan with the majority authored from Ottawa. Most of the
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stories centred on the troops who died, including a friendly-fire incident
on September 4 in which two U.S. jets erroneously strafed Canadians in
Operation Medusa, killing one and injuring dozens. That incident followed
the deaths of four Canadians in combat, ensuring a steady stream of com-
ment on Afghan fatalities, what could be done to prevent them, and the New
Democratic Party's call for a pull-out of Canadians from Afghanistan at
its party convention. Prime Minister Stephen Harper figured prominently
in only one news story relating to Sept. 11 and its link to Canada's tole in
Afghanistan. The Post carried two news stories by CanWest affiliate, the
Calgary Herald's Renata D'Aliesio, about a school that had been r~duced to
rubble during Operation Medusa and a wrap-up story on Medusa's success
in which she quoted Asadullah Khalid, the Governor of Kandahar province,
from a news conference.
The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax)
The Chronicle-Herald carried twenty-three news stories and one opinion piece
related to Afghanistan during Operation Medusa. Most of the ten stories'
originating from Afghanistan were authored by the Canadian Press's Les
Perreaux and centred on the deaths of the five Canadians killed early in the
operation. The balance of stories authored in Canada focused on the grieving
families, NATO's call for more troops in Afghanistan, and the NDP's call for
a withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Stephen
Harper figured in just one 9/11 story and its links to Canada's war on terror.
It also carried a Canadian Press story by Les Perreaux on September 18 about
the success of Operation Medusa..
The Gazette (Montreal)
Of the thirty-five news stories and one opinion piece carried by the Gazette
during Operation Medusa, thirteen were datelined from Afghanistan. Of
them, six, or almost half; were authored by Renata D'Aliesio of its CanWest
affiliate the Calgary Herald, who wrote about the soldiers' thoughts of tak-
ing lives, their occupation of abandoned Taliban strongholds, and farmers
resuming their daily activities. The vast majority of stories dealt with sol-
diers' deaths, ~amilies' remembering them, funerals, and, not surprisingly,
the New Democratic convention held in Quebec City, which called for the.
pull-out of Canadian troops from Afghanistan. The fact the convention was
in Quebec City made it a natural draw for a Montreal newspaper. Prominent
references to Prime Minister Harper included his linkage of the 9/11 attacks
and Canada's Afghan mission. There was no wrap-up story on Medusa's
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success. Rather, the last story written during its timeframe argued the
Canadian deaths were far greater than American, quoting the left-wing
Centre for Policy Alternatives.
The Globe and Mail
The Globe and Mail, also distributed nationally, carried forty-seven news
stories about Afghanistan during Operation Medusa, eight opinion pieces,
three editorials, and one analysis piece. Seventeen of the news stories were
datelined Afghanistan. Of these, sixteen were authored by Graeme Smith.
Smith was clearly in the thick of things in Medusa from the beginning.
When four Canadians were killed on the first day of battle, his report was
the only one that included reaction from a Taliban fighter. Smith managed
to file a remarkably detailed report of Canadians advancing on insurgents
under bright moonlight and later engaging four Taliban fighters, calling in
helicopter support and rocket fire and, ultimately, the 25-millimetre gun on
Major Geoff Abthorpe's LAV 3, "destroying" an AK-47-wielding insurgent
on September 6. Otherwise, his coverage followed a pattern of reporting on
the Canadians killed and others wounded by an accidental American straf-
ing; althpugh he did report on other combat operations, the reports of deaths
were sanitized as numbers only. The balance of the Globe's coverage was
largely written in Ottawa and Toronto as localized follow-ups to his reports,
and news and analysis of the New Democratic Party's stand on pulling the
troops out of Afghanistan. Editorially, the newspaper tore into then-Defence
Minister Gordon O'Connor, who told the Reuters news service in Australia
that NATO needed more troops in Afghanistan. The newspaper said that
Canadians needed to be far better informed about the Afghan mission than
by learning about it from O'Connor half a world away. The newspaper was
also the first to correctly report on Canada sending fifteen Leopard tanks and
120 more troops to Afghanistan due to the lessons learned about the Taliban's
conventional combat posture in Operation Medusa as opposed to its more
traditional hit and run tactics. Smith's coverage concluded with a story on the
success of Medusa in which he interviewed Asadullah Khalid, the Governor
of Kandahar province and another story quoting a Taliban member who saw
his comrades shredded in battle, but who vowed to fight on.
The Toronto Star
The Star carried thirty-three news stories related to Afghanistan, but only
eight of those were datelined from that country, five of which were written
by the Canadian Press's Les Perreaux. His most prominent pieces in The Star
65
CENSORSHIP
involved the early incidents in which four soldiers died in combat and one
was killed by a U.S. strafing accident and dozens were injured. Much of the
news was follow-up, reporting on the caskets returning home, the funerals,
and the deceased soldiers' grieving families. In a report on September 11,
Prime Minister Stephen Harper linked the mission in Afghanistan to 9/11.
Three analysis pieces were written, the strongest of which argued counterfac-
tually that, if9/11 had never happened, no one would care about Afghanistan.
Eight opinion pieces were written; the strongest two linked the Canadian
combat mission to the American mission' in Iraq and Prime Minister Harper
following U.S. President George Bush's script. Editorially, after five soldiers
were killed, the newspaper called on the prime minister to define success in
Afghanistan and, in a second, said Canada's role in Afghanistan was justi-
fied and condemned the New Democratic Party for vote-pandering on the
back of the Canadian deaths. There was no wrap-up story saying Operation
Medusa had been a success.
The Vancouver Sun
The Sun carried twenty-one news stories and three editorials during the
period of Operation Medusa. Only five of the news stories identified as
coming from CanWest News Services were datelined Afghanistan. The bal-
ance originated in Vancouver and Ottawa. The most prominent news stories
reported the deaths of four Canadians killed in early combat and one ac-
cidently killed in a U.S. strafing while dozens of others were injured. Most of
the stories followed up on the deaths with stories originating in Canada and
the New Democratic Party's demands for Canada to pull out of Afghanistan.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper linked the mission in Afghanistan to 9/11
in a September 11 follow-up. The newspaper wrapped up its Medusa cover-
age with the Calgary Herald's Renata D'Aliesio's story on Medusa's success
in which she quoted Brigadier General David Fraser, the Canadian NATO
commander in southern Afghanistan. Editorially, the newspaper criticized
the New Democratic Party's stand on Afghanistan and called for NATO's
European members to commit more troops to the Afghan mission.
Winnipeg Free Press
The Free Press carried sixteen news stories on Afghanistan, all of which were
written by either CanWest News Service or Canadian Press writers. The ma-
jority of the stories reported or followed up on the combat deaths of four
Canadian soldiers early in Operation Medusa and a friendly-fire incident in
which one Canadian was killed and dozens of others wounded when a U.S.
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warplane accidently strafed them. On September 11, Prime' Minster Stephen
Harper was reported linking 9/11 to the Afghan mission. The newspaper's
coverage concluded with a Canadian Press/Associated Press story on the suc-
cess of Medusa in which Asadullah Khalid, the Governor of Kandahar prov-
ince, was interviewed. A second story on the same day was a CanWest news
service report that the Canadian deaths in Afghanistan were far greater than
Americans, quoting the left-wing Centre for Policy Alternatives.
Discussion and Conclusions
Comparing case studies of English-language news media reports from the
First World War, the Second World WilT, Korea, the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
the 1999 Kosovo Air War, and the war against insurgents in Afghanistan
is interesting. However, it must be noted that case study research is always
limited in what it can conclude. One ba~le does not a war make, and one
may win a battle but still lose the war. No conclusions can be extrapolated to
French Canadian news media, or radio, or television. Still, the comparisons
show that the low point in Canadian war journalism must surely be Max
Aitken's reporting from the First World War in which he refused to go to the
front lines and, i~stead, chose to pen upbeat reports about battles, including
the disaster at St. Eloi's craters.
One of the most stirring accounts' of Canadians in battle must certainly
be Ross Munro's account of the Canadian assault on Dieppe during the
Second World War. Unfortunately, he neglected to report that Canadians
were slaughtered on the beaches. Brave as he was for being there in the first
place and returning to the beaches in a landing craft, it would have helped
if he had told the catastrophic truth about it. Later, it eventually came out
anyway, no thanks to Munro. Even though there was official government-
mandated censorship during the First and Second World Wars, there was no
real need to censor either Aitken or Munro; they censored themselves.
That Bill Boss lived through the Battle of Kap'yong during the Korean
War and was able to report on it is astonishing. His report of that battle is one
of the greatest journalism stories of all time and he is the one who should be
lionized in Canadian journalism history, not Munro. What is enlightening
about Boss's reports is, that the newspapers that ran them indicated they were
censored so he could not report soldiers' names, hometown, or the battle's
location. The newspapers found a way around the location censorship by
indicating that it was likely imposed by the military and not the government.
It is passing strange that soldiers' names could not be used. Names give life
to words on a page and it is unlikely in the days when television was still
in its infancy that identified soldiers could face r~tribution for their actions.
67
CENSORSHIP
The 1991 Persian Gulf War must be seen as the beginning of institution-
alizing Canadian military restrictions and censorship on the news media
with the development of the first embedding agreement. The newspapers of
the day were correct to see it for what it was: censorship. It would be just the
tip of the iceberg.
The Canadian news media coverage of the 1999 Kosovo Air War scrapes
near the bottom of the barrel. Military commanders did not give journalists
access to their men and women out of mythical operational security concerns
emanating from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In doing so, they completely
undermined one of the values the military in Canada's democracy is sup-
posed to defend: freedom of the news media subject only to such reasonable
limits in law demonstrable in a free and democratic society. That they failed
to do so is reprehensible.
The Afghanistan news coverage case study shows a number of things.
In the first instance, covering a war is not like reporting a train wreck in
Canada. If a journalist is not there to eyewitness a battle, he or she cannot
jump in a cab and catch the aftermath. The Globe and Mail's Smith was the
only journalist on the ground to cover the September 5 battle in Panjwaii
and, thus, was the only one able to report on it. This is not a condemnation of
the other journalists risking their lives covering Operation Medusa; they just
were not in the neighbourhood. A second thing that the Medusa case study
shows is that it was a one-of-a-kind battle. It is not reasonable to expect the
kind of coverage Bill Boss delivered during the pitched battle at Kap'yong or
Smith delivered in Panjwaii every day. It was not possible during the Korean
War and it is even less possible in the war against insurgents in Afghanistan.
They are not the same kind of wars, again demonstrating the limitations of
case study research and its conclusions.
A third thing, however, that the Medusa news media case study points
toward is the homogeneity of the Canadian news media. Even across com-
petitors in different cities, the news media coverage was remarkably similar.
Having said that, a fourth thing it points toward is that, while there is generic
homogeneity, editors also have wide latitude to pick and chose which repor-
ter's stories they use. Clearly, with the Calgary Herald's Renata D'Aliesio embed-
ded, they used her material the most. Other CanWest newspapers did not.
Fifth, the Medusa case shows the tremendous agenda-setting power of
the prime minister. When Stephen Harper linked 9/11 to Canada's role in
Afghanistan on September 11, 2006, his argument was dutifully reported.
But, in one of the most heated battles of the conflict, with Canadians dying in
record numbers, the prime minister spoke only once.
The sixth thing the Medusa case study confirms is the truism that, "if it
bleeds, it leads." The stories that appeared about Medusa's success at the time
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were overshadowed, if not overwhelmed, by the sheer volume of reporting
on the four soldiers killed on the first day of battle, the pictures of ramp cere-
monies, the follow-ups on the coffins' return to Canada and the funerals.
Obviously, situations can change over time, but it could have been reported
at the time that the four did not die in vain.
From the qualitative newspaper evidence and interviews, there can be
little doubt that the Canadian news media in Afghanistan is restricted in its
,coverage of the mission by the ground rules agreement and pressure from
commanders and public affairs officers. It would be incorrect, however, to say
that the restrictions placed on the media. by the embedding agreement are
uniform. They seem to vary from commander to commander, from public
affairs officer to public affairs officer, and from situation to situation. The one
thing that can be said, however, is that, should the need arise, the embedding
agreement can be dusted off at any time to serve "operational security" as the
military sees fit. It takes a courageous journalist, indeed, to stand up to the
military in such situations.
The evidence firmly establishes the news media coverage of Afghanistan
on a historical continuum where Bill Boss's reporting of Kap'yong stands out
like a healthy thumb on a sore hand. The news media embedding program
in Afghanistan is, at best, imperfect and, at worst, the lesser of two evils.
While arguments have been made that reporters must find ways to report on
Canada's role independently, it is difficult to conceive how such can be done
safely. The one reporter who tried it, the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith, was
targeted by gunmen who sacked his office compound and beat up his cook. It
is argued that the public's right to know is not worth the life of one soldier. It
can also be argued that the public's right to know is not worth the life of one
journalist. That Smith had the courage to routinely unembed himself and
travel into some of the most dangerous places in the world at great risk to his
own personal well-being is commendable, to say the very least.
Smith is also correct in saying that the Canadian news media industry is
failing Canadians badly during Canada's single largest foreign policy com-
mitment since the Korean War. At time of writing, 132 soldiers and one dip-
lomat had lost their lives in Afghanistan. Yet, only one reporter, Smith, was
permanently assigned to Afghanistan. This is appalling. At the same time, it
is difficult to argue that Canadian journalists should be compelled to live and
work permanently in Afghanistan as Smith did.
The alternatives that have arisen in absence of such a commitment are
also commendable. It is encouraging that a handful of senior journalists re-
turn time and again for their news outlets and news services. They know the
grave peril that awaits them in Afghanistan, unlike first-timers who know
not what they ask for when they agree to embed in Afghanistan.
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That hundreds have agreed to embed is encouraging because that means
that hundreds of journalists have been exposed to the Canadian Forces who
had not been before. What is less encouraging is that, once back in Canada,
few see the need to ever report on the military again. It is as if having an
. Afghan visa in their passport is a rite of passage. Unlike the military, journal-
ists have no collective memory, no body of wisdom that can be systematically
passed along, not from just one journalist to the next, but from one genera-
tion to another. As imperfect as the embedding agreement is, Canadians are
also not well served by most of the news media that is not well positioned to
challenge restrictions the military imposes. They deserve much better.
There is even worse news: the military tried to restrict an academic who
dared to research precisely that issue. Canadians deserve much better from
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List of releasable and non-releasable information for Embedded Media.
Non-releasable information
1. Unless specifically approved by the Commander Task Force or designated
officer, the following categories of information are not releasable since their
publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.
a. Specific information on troop strength, equipment or criti-
cal supplies (e.g. artillery, radars, trucks, water, etc.).
b. Specific number of aircraft in units below wing levet or
identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than
land or carrier based. Number and type of aircraft may
be described in very general terms such as "large flight/'
"small flight/' "many/' IJfew/' "fighters/' "fixed wing/' etc.
c. Units in the Area of Operation, unless specifically autho-
rized by a release authority.
d. Information regarding future operations, current opera-
tions, postponed or cancelled operations, or information
regarding security precautions at military installations or
encampments.
e.. Photography that would show level of security at military
installations or encampments, especially aerial and satellite
photography which would reveal the name of specific loca-
tion of military units or installations.
f. Rules of Engagement.
g. Name of military installations or specific geographic loca-
tions of military units in the area of responsibility.
h. Information on intelligence collection activities including
targets, methods of attack and results.
j. Extra precaution in reporting will be required at the start of
an operation to maximize operational surprise. Therefore,
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broadcasts from airfields by embedded media members are
prohibited until authorized by the unit commander.
k. During an operation, specific information on friendly fire
force troop movements, tactical deployments; and disposi-
tions that would jeopardize operational security or lives.
Information on on-going engagements will not be released
unless authorized by the on-scene commander.
m. Information on postponed or cancelled operations
n. Information on missing or downed aircraft while search
and rescue and recovery operations are being planned and
executed.
p. Information on special operations units.
q. Information on effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare.
r. Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, decep-
tion, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collec-
tion or security measures.
s. No photographs or other visual media showing a detained
person's recognizable face, nametag or other identifying
feature or item may be taken.
t. Information regarding force protection measures at military
installations of encampments, except those that are visible
or readily apparent.
u. No still or video of deployed special operations forces.
v. Any other information that may be restricted from time to
time by the Commander Canadian Forces Task Force due to
operational requirements.
Releasable Information
2. The following categories of information are releasable.
a. Arrival of military units in the area of operation when of-
ficially announced. Mode of travel (sea or air), dates of de-
parture, and home station.
b. Approximate friendly force strength figures.
c. Non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding air and
ground past operations.
d. Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation
may be disclosed using general terms such as "multi-unit."
Specific force or unit identification may be released when
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authorized by the Commander Canadian Forces Task Force
or his designate.
e. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as
"land-based."
f. Date, time Qr location of completed military missions and
actions as well as mission results.
g. Type of ordnance expended in general terms.
h. Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sor-
ties flown in the Area of Operation.
j. Type of forces involved (e.g. air defence, infantry, amour)
with exception of Special Forces.
k. Weather and climate conditions.
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